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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 5108: AN
APPENDIX ON UNCONSCIONABILITY
IN CALIFORNIA
The preceding article by Charles H. Hurd and Phillip L. Bush advo-
cates the adoption of section 5108 in California Senate Bill No.
3, which would establish a statutory doctrine of unconscionability.
The authors prefer an expanded version of section 5108: the first
part incorporates a provision similar to section 2-302(1) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, and a second part provides a list of nine
factors relevant to -the issue of unconscionability. The authors
demonstrate the need for this legislation and the desirability of
a flexible application of the doctrine.
In this appendix, Mark W Westra analyzes the application of the
nine factors listed in section 5108 in terms of existing principles
of California law. It is shown that the examination of these
statutorily enumerated factors in consumer cases should aid in
a more consistent application of the doctrine of unconscionability
in California.
Section 5108, composed of a general unconscionability pro-
vision and also nine factors indicative of unconscionability, has been
advanced m order to provide greater protection for consumers.' The
utility of the proposed statute lies m its ability to aid the judicial
decision-making process by listing specific factors which the courts
would use in analyzing consumer transactions.' This appendix dis-
cusses the extent to which prior decisions have dealt with these various
factors in cases which, while not explicitly mentioning unconscion-
ability, nevertheless involved patterns of oppression and lack of fair-
ness characteristic of unconscionable transactions.
The Proposed Statute
The unconscionability provision currently under consideration in
1. See the accompanying article, Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of
Conscience for California Consumers.
2. The doctrine of unconscionability was thought to add a vague new concept
to California law. MARSH & WARREN, REPORT ON PREPARED AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXM
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART I-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
436, 455-57 (1961). Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302 was never enacted in
California. See Cal. State Bar Comm. on the Commercial Code, A Special Report,
The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CAL. Sr. B.J. 117, 135-36 (1962).
California as part of the proposed Consumer Code provides:
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds that a consumer trans-
action, any aspect of the transaction, any conduct directed against
the consumer by a party to the transaction, or any result of the
transaction is unconscionable, the court shall, in addition to any
other remedies available to the consumer under this, or any other
act or rule of law, either refuse to enforce the transaction against
the consumer, or so limit the application of any unconscionable
aspect or conduct so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(b) Specific practices forbidden by the adnimstrator m regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to Section 6104 shall be presumed to
be unconscionable.
(c) Without limiting the scope of subdivision (a), the court shall
consider among other things, all the following as pertinent to
the issue of unconscionability"
(1) The degree to which the practice unfairly takes advantage
of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of con-
sumers.
(2) Knowledge by those engaging in the practice of the inabil-
ity of consumers to receive benefits properly anticipated from the
goods or services involved.
(3) Gross disparity between the price of goods or services and
their value as measured by the price at which similar goods or ser-
vices are readily obtainable by other consumers, or by other tests
of true value.
(4) The fact that the practice may enable merchants to take
advantage of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their
interests by reason of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy
or inability to understand the language of the agreement, ignor-
ance or lack of education or similar factors.
(5) The degree to which terms of the transaction require con-
sumers to waive legal rights.
(6) The degree to which terms of the transaction require con-
sumers to jeopardize money or property beyond the money or prop-
erty immediately at issue in the transaction.
(7) The degree to which the natural effect of the practice is to
cause or aid in causing consumers to misunderstand the true nature
of the transaction or their rights and duties thereunder.
(8) The extent or degree to which the writing purporting to
evidence the obligation of the consumer in the transaction contains
terms or provisions or authorizes practices prohibited by law
(9) Definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations,
rulings and decisions of legislative, administrative, or judicial bodies
in this state or elsewhere.
(d) In addition to the protection afforded m subdivision (a), the
consumer shall be entitled upon finding of unconscionabiity to
recover from the creditor or person responsible for the uncon-
scionable conduct reasonable attorney's fees. Reasonable attor-
ney's fees shall be determined by the reasonable value of the time
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reasonably expended by the attorney and not by the amount of
the recovery on behalf of the debtor.3
To predict the application of the nine elements in part (c) of
the proposed statute, it is necessary to examine the existing California
common law doctrine of unconscionability. In addition, since the
ninth element encourages the courts to look elsewhere for definitive
rulings on unconscionability, 4 leading cases involving consumer ac-
tions m jurisdictions presently operating with an unconscionability
statute will be presented." Inasmuch as other jurisdictions have had
experience operating under such a statute, their determinations will
be particularly instructive both as to the extent to which the doctrine
will be utilized and as to the limits which have been defined.
It must be emphasized that the presence of any individual ele-
ment does not necessitate a finding of unconscionability. The courts
will not be limited by subdivisions (a) or (c) in their examination
of the facts of a particular case.6  To the contrary, the ninth element
grants considerable latitude to consider additional facts in analyzing
any given factual situation.7 A finding of unconscionability requires
an examination of whether,
in the light of the background and setting of the market, the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, and the con-
dition of the particular parties to the contract, the contract or
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under
the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the con-
tract. The particular facts involved in each case are of utmost im-
portance since certain contracts or contractual provisions may be
unconscionable in some situations but not in others.8
3. California Senate Bill No. 3, introduced Jan. 3, 1972, as amended, July 27,
1972 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 3]. The bill was reintroduced in substantially similar
form on January 8, 1973. In large part, the proposed code is structured around a re-
vised version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and various existing statutory
protections for the consumer. The basic unconscionability provision of S.B. 3 section
5108(a) is similar to Uniform Consumer Credit Code section 5.108 and also to section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The nine factors listed in S.B. 3 section
5108(c)(1)-(9) originated in section 5.107 of the National Consumer Act. Section
5108(d) was derived from section 5.307 of the National Consumer Act.
4. S.B. 3 § 5108(c) (9), supra note 3.
5. The comment to section 5.107 of the National Consumer Act relates the ex-
periences of states operating under section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
"Nearly fifteen years of experience with this . .section has shown that 'uncon-
scionability' is so broad and undefined as to enable courts to run roughshod over the
legitimate interests of merchants. In fact, the experience has been quite to the con-
trary; the few cases reported on Section 2-302 have been markedly conservative in
their interpretation." NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 5.107, Comment 1 (First Final
Draft 1970).
6. S.B. 3 section 5108(c), supra note 3, makes it clear that additional factors
may arise warranting the consideration of the court.
7. S.B. 3 § 5108(c) (9), supra note 3.
8. UN FORM CoNstMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108, Comment 2.
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Many of these elements of unconscionability are not new, but
have been considered by the courts in applying traditional doctrmesY
Such elements often seem to be the underlying, though often unmen-
tioned, reason for a result reached by construing away an offensive
clause. 10  Since the recognition of consumers as a class requiring
special protection in many situations is relatively new," the Californ-
ia law on many of these elements is derived from nonconsumer cases.
However, there can be no doubt that protections afforded in non-
consumer cases have full applicability in cases where a consumer is
a party 12
The First Consideration
The Degree to which the Practice Unfairly Takes Advantage of
Lack of Knowledge, Ability, Experience, or Capacity of Consumers
Some of the problems arising under criterion one are particularly
difficult to classify because of the interrelation of the different ele-
ments: knowledge, ability, experience, and capacity " For example,
the capacity of a consumer is necessarily a summation of many fac-
tors, such as his knowledge of commercial transactions, his ability
9. Unconscionability is not a new concept in California law. See, e.g., Swan-
son v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404 (1944).
10. See W HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES 23-24 (1958). "Because § 2-302
is not intended to change the results courts have been reaching m cases involving un-
conscionable contracts, but is intended merely to make it possible for courts to pass
directly on the question of unconscionability, the operative results of the section can
be predicted by looking to the cases in which the courts have actually employed the
doctrine of unconscionability by adversely construing language or manipulating con-
cepts." See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kessler].
11. Compare Hischemoeller v. National Ice & Cold Storage Co., 46 Cal. 2d 318,
294 P.2d 433 (1956), with Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319,
87 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970). Also, m applying the Unruh Act, California Civil Code
section 1801 et seq. (West 1973), the distinction between the purchase of goods for
consumer uses and for business uses must be made. James Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 266
Cal. App. 2d 384, 72 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1968).
12. "Protection of unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is
an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary society." Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1971). Con-
sumers should expect that existing statutes will be interpreted liberally for their pro-
tection. See Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1968).
13. The four words are quite close in meaning. Knowledge is defined as "ac-
quaintance with facts, truths, or principles gained by sight, experience or report."
Experience is "knowledge or practical wisdom gained from what one has observed,
encountered, or undergone." Capacity is the "actual or potential ability to perform,
yield or withstand." Ability is the "power or capacity to do or act physically, men-
tally, legally, morally, [or] financially [or] competence in an activity
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Unabr. ed. 1967).
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to communicate and bargain, and his ability to recognize a fair price
or reasonable terms. While problems of knowledge often receive at-
tention, the other three elements rarely receive independent examina-
tion by the courts. This is not to say, however, that the ability,
experience, and capacity of the consumer are not important ele-
ments in contract formation. The common law doctrine of duress
involves the capacity of the threatened party to withstand the threat
used to overcome his free will. 4 Similarly, undue influence requires
a finding that unfair advantage was taken of some incapacity or weak-
ness of the servient person.15 Unfair advantage is relative to the
servient person's ability to protect Ins own interests. Also, when
courts speak of the inequality of bargaining power present in ad-
hesion contract situations, they are referring to the servient person's
relative lack of economic strength, his lack of knowledge of the terms
or the transaction, and his inability to bargain freely.'
Knowledge
Problems involving lack of knowledge generally arise when one
of the parties seeks to avoid obligations contained in a contract he
signed but did not read or understand, or contained in an instrument
he accepted though unaware of its contractual nature.", Since he
was unaware of his obligations under the agreement, the unknowing
party alleges that the element of mutual assent was absent and that
a valid contract was never formed.
Traditionally, the general rule has been that the parties to an
agreement are bound by the plain import of the language used re-
gardless of their lack of knowledge or understanding of the terms of
the contract.' 8 This rule was required if the concept of freedom of
contract was to dominate economic affairs.' 9 In order to achieve the
certainty thought necessary, each contracting party was assumed to
have the inherent ability to read and to understand the language of
an agreement. Further, the signature of a party was considered evi-
dence that he had actually read and understood the contract.
Even before doubts arose concerning the adequacy of the free-
14. See text accompanying notes 108-169 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 170-189 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 48-107 infra.
17. The effect of the seller's knowledge that the consumer will not be receiving
benefits reasonably anticipated under the contract will be considered in the text ac-
companying notes 191-203 znfra.
18. E.g., Smith v. Occidental & Oriental S.S. Co., 99 Cal. 462, 34 P 84 (1893);
Bauer v. Iackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971); Silva v. Silva,
32 Cal. App. 115, 162 P. 142 (1916).
19. See Kessler, supra note 10.
dom of contract concept,20 the courts began to qualify this harsh rule.
It has long been recognized that assent gained through fraud, duress,
or undue influence is not freely given. Contracts so formed would
not be enforced by the courts.21  Moreover, courts have been hesi-
tant to enforce a term of a contract when one party had neither
actual nor constructive knowledge of the terms.12-  Thus, a con-
tracting party is bound to the terms of a contract when he has actual
knowledge of the terms or when a reasonably prudent man would
be familiar with the nature of the document he was signing or ac-
cepting.2" Whether or not the individual has acted as a reasonably
prudent man is, of course, a question of fact to be determined by
an examination of the circumstances surrounding the formation of
the questioned agreement. 24  There are two areas m which this
problem has arisen: where the party was unaware that the instrument
he accepted contained contractual provisions and where the party has
signed an instrument thinking it to be of a different nature.
Acceptance of Instruments Containing Contractual Provisions
With increasing frequency, contractual provisions are being
placed on a myriad of seemingly innocuous forms, such as baggage
claim checks, hat checks, parking claim checks, bank passbooks.
and admission tickets.2 5 Most people do not read the inconspicuous
provisions on a piece of paper not generally thought to have con-
tractual implications, nor is their attention normally directed to the
contents by the giver of the document. 26  Nonetheless, such con-
tractual provisions have been enforced against the lack of knowledge
20. Id.
21. Silva v. Silva, 32 Cal. App. 115, 162 P 142 (1916).
22. See, e.g., Merrill v. Pacific Transfer Co., 131 Cal. 582, 587, 63 P 915, 916
(1901).
23. Id., see United States v. Klatt, 135 F Supp. 648 (S.D. Cal. 1955); C.I.T.
Corp. v. Panac, 25 Cal. 2d 547, 154 P.2d 710 (1944).
24. "The jury may take into consideration the age and mental and physical
condition of the person signing, as well as mercantile usages of trade and commercial
intercourse " C.I.T. Corp. v Panac, 25 Cal. 2d 547, 559, 154 P.2d 710, 718
(1944); see India Paint & Lacquer Co. v. United Steel Prods. Corp., 123 Cal. App. 2d
597, 267 P.2d 408 (1954).
25. See, e.g., Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 87
Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970) (baggage claim check); California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-
Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d 71, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1967)
(automobile claim check); Polonsky v. Umon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 334 Mass. 697,
138 N.E.2d 115 (1956) (bank passbook); Klav v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 App.
Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd per curam, 296 N.Y 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947)
(baggage claim check).
26. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 613, 182 P 293,
298 (1919). See cases cited notes 80-81 infra.
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of the receiver if he accepted delivery under such circumstances that
a reasonably prudent man could and should have read such pro-
visions. 27
It has been asserted that mere acceptance of a form containing
contractual obligations creates a presumption of knowledge. If the
party accepting such a form did not read it, he has the burden of
"satisfactorily explaining his failure to do what the law required him
to do.' 2s  However, this has not been followed, and acceptance of
a form is only one of many circumstances that must be evaluated in
order to determine if the receiver should have been put on notice
of the contractual nature of the form.29  For example, in Cali-
fornia State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v Bar-
rett Garages, Inc.,30 the owner of a vehicle was given a claim
check when he drove into a parking lot at an airport. He never
read, nor was his attention ever directed to the printed provision
which declared the form to be a contract limiting liability for
theft. To the owner of the vehicle, the purpose of the claim check
was for identification only When the owner returned, the car had
been stolen. The company operating the parking lot sought to
avoid liability because of the limitation contained on the claim check.
Under the circumstances, the court held that the owner of the vehicle,
acting as a reasonably prudent man, would not be aware of the
existence of a contract based on the provisions contained in the claim
check. Therefore, he could not be held to the limitation contained
therein.3 1  In considering the circumstances under which the instru-
ment was accepted, the following were taken into account: the size
of the paper, the type styles of the printed matter, the size and loca-
tion of signs calling attention to the provisions, the lighting of the
area, and the amount of time the acceptor had to read and study the
document. If the circumstances indicate that a reasonable man would
27. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 257
Cal. App. 2d 71, 76, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (1967).
28. Cunningham v. International Comm. of the YMCA, 51 Cal. App. 487, 491,
197 P 140, 141 (1921). This case was thought to place California within a small
minority of states which hold that claim checks are automatically binding. 23 S. CAL.
L. REV. 122 (1949); see U Drive & Tour, Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 28 Cal.
App. 2d 782, 71 P.2d 354 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1937).
29. Curtis v. United Transfer Co., 167 Cal. 112, 116, 138 P 726, 727 (1914);
California State Auto. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d
71, 77, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699, 704 (1967).
30. 257 Cal. App. 2d 71, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1967).
31. Id. The owners of the parking lot were not complying with the provisions
of the California Civil Code. No bailment contract for auto parking will be effective
unless "a copy of the contract in large type, in an area at least 17 by 22 inches,
[is] posted m a conspicuous spot at each entrance of the parking lot." CAL. Civ.
CoDE § 1630 (West 1973). Compliance with this statute, however, would not by
itself create a contract. 257 Cal. App. 2d at 80, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (dictum).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
have inquired into the nature and terms of the instrument he accepted,
constructive knowledge sufficient for meaningful consent to contract
will be found.32
Misunderstanding of the Nature of the Document
Also of importance in determining whether a person is negligent
in accepting or signing an instrument without reading it are represen-
tations made to him about the nature of the document. A misrepre-
sentation of the nature of the document, if reasonably relied upon by
the person accepting the document, is sufficient to negate constructive
knowledge. For example m McQueen v Tyler,33 a shipper of house-
hold goods was presented with a freight bill at dusk, after the loading
of the carrier's truck. The shipper testified that although he could
not read the document because of the darkness, he had signed it be-
cause of the carrier's representation that the paper was only an "auth-
orization to take the goods. ' 34  The document, however, limited the
carrier's liability for damage to the goods to ten cents per pound.
The court held that the shipper's reliance on the misrepresentation
was reasonable under the circumstances and that he could not be
bound by the limitation on liability because of his lack of know-
ledge of the terms.35
If the offeree is able to read the contract, but does not do so
because of representations by the other party, he may still not be
negligent in failing to read the contract if a confidential relation
exists between the parties. A confidential relationship is present
32. See 257 Cal. App. 2d at 80, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 705. The court in Barrett
Garages did not think it necessary to discuss the application of adhesion contract
language because of their holding that delivery of a claim check to a bailor does not
create a contract as a matter of law. Id. at 79, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
33. 61 Cal. App. 2d 263, 142 P.2d 466 (1943), disapproved in Hischemoeller v.
National Ice & Cold Storage Co., 46 Cal. 2d 318, 328, 294 P.2d 433, 439 (1956).
But see Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 881, 377 P.2d 284, 296, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 184 (1962); Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d
319, 333-34, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307-08 (1970).
34. 61 Cal. App. 2d 263, 266, 142 P.2d 466, 468 (1943).
35. In Forte v. Nolfi, 25 Cal. App. 3d 656, 102 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972), plaintiff
sought rescission of a deed of trust she signed without knowledge of the nature of the
document. In allowing rescission, the court found that she was justified in relying
upon the representations of the defendant's agent that she was only signing a con-
tractor's proposal. See Smith v. Occidental & Oriental S.S. Co., 99 Cal. 462, 34 P 84
(1893) (release signed on representations by defendant's agent that it was only a
receipt); Gardner v. Rubm, 149 Cal. App. 2d 368, 308 P.2d 892 (1957) (elderly,
semi-illiterate couple signed a document containing deed of trust on their home in re-
liance upon representations by defendants); Valdez v Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal. App.
2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1954) (insured justified in relying on representations made by
insurance salesman because of complexity of insurance policies).
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"whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the in-
tegrity and fidelity of another."36  The existence of such a relation-
ship justifies reliance on the representations as to the nature or terms
of an agreement presented by the person in whom trust is reposed.3"
Therefore, a person who signs a contract in reliance on representa-
tions made in such a situation will not have constructive knowledge
of the terms of the agreement.3 '
Plain and Conspicuous Notification
Certain types of contracts require a higher standard of know-
ledge on the part of the offeree. Such a standard may be imposed
by statute 9 or by the courts because of the nature of the contract.4"
Contracts containing provisions limiting the liability of a common
carrier, an insurance company, a bank, a bailee, or a warehouse-
man have been held ineffective in the "absence of plain and clear
notification to the public."41 In the case of carriers and bailees, the
higher standard is imposed because of public policy prohibitions
36. Kloehn v. Prendiville, 154 Cal. App. 2d 156, 160-61, 316 P.2d 17, 21
(1957).
37. Kloehn v. Prendiville, 154 Cal. App. 2d 156, 316 P.2d 17 (1957). Plaintiff,
aged 63, resided with the defendants, and even though they were not related, plaintiff
was regarded as a member of the family. Shortly after being hospitalized for a
month and while still under the nursing care of the defendants, plaintiff executed a
deed conveying his property to the defendants. Plaintiff did not read the deed, but
signed it m reliance upon representations that the defendants would provide a home
for him as long as he lived. The deed, however, contained a provision that fifty
dollars per month room and board would be charged against a note for the value of
the property. Several years later when full payment for the note had been made in
this manner, the defendants informed him that he must now pay fifty dollars per
month. The court granted rescission of the deed. The plaintiff was justified m not
reading the deed based on the confidential relationship that existed with the defendant.
See text accompanying note 174 infra.
38. Kloehn v. Prendiville, 154 Cal. App. 2d 156, 316 P.2d 17 (1957).
39. E.g., CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2176 (West 1954): "A passenger, consignor, or
consignee, by accepting a ticket, bill of lading, or written contract for carnage, with a
knowledge of its terms, assents to the rate of hire. and also to the limitation stated
therein upon the amount of the carner's liability in case property cared . is lost
or injured, when the value of such property is not named " This statute has
been interpreted to require knowledge of the terms of the limitation in the contract
based on actual or constructive notification. Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines,
8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 337, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297, 310 (1970); Murray v. Southern Pac. Co.,
112 Cal. App. 150, 156, 296 P 667, 670 (1931).
40. See, e.g., Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 P. 292
(1910) (insurance contracts).
41. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 883, 377 P.2d 284, 297,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185 (1962) (insurance contracts); Muelder v. Western Greyhound
Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 333, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (1970) (contract with common
carrier).
against limitations on liability for negligence or want of ordinary
care.4 2  Insurance policies have long been thought to be so involved
and complicated that few people would be cognizant of the terms
of their contracts.43 Therefore, limitations which would disappoint
the reasonable expectations of the policy holder are ineffective unless
communicated to the policy holder m unambigious language that
is "conspiclous, plain and clear."44  This requirement places an af-
firmative duty on the insurer, bailee, or carrier to use methods reason-
ably certain to make the consumer aware of the contractual terms
before he assents. 5
Further protections have been afforded consumers in various
types of contracts. Recent consumer-oriented legislation seeks to
impose a duty of disclosure upon certain sellers,4 6 thereby protecting
the consumer against the use of many unfair practices whether he
has knowledge of the unfair provision or not. In retail installment
sales contracts, a merchant is not permitted to take advantage of a
consumer who has in effect waived knowledge of the terms of a con-
tract by signing a standardized contract containing blank spaces to
be filled in later by the merchant.4 7  Similarly, retail installment
sales contracts containing provisions which confess judgment, agree
to a forum inconvenient to the consumer, or waive defenses against
the seller are not enforceable against the consumer.48  The consumer
in such cases is granted protection regardless of his knowledge of the
offensive provision.
42. Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 328-29, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 303-04 (1970); England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562,
571, 271 P 532, 536 (1928).
43. Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 230, 107 P 292, 298
(1910); Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 278 P.2d 91, 94-95
(1954).
44. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878, 377 P.2d 284, 294,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 182 (1962).
45. Wilson v. Crown Transfer & Storage Co., 201 Cal. 701, 714, 258 P 596,
602 (1927); Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 P 292 (1910);
Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382, petition
for rehearing denied, 78 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1969); McQueen v. Tyler, 61 Cal. App. 2d
263, 267, 142 P.2d 466, 469 (1943). A similar requirement applies to bankers to make
the customer aware of statements contained in the front of a bank passbook. Los
Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P 293 (1919); see Frankim v.
Bank of America, 12 Cal. App. 2d 298, 55 P.2d 232 (1936).
46. Unruh Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1801 et seq. (West 1973); Automobile Sales
Finance Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 2981 et seq. (West Supp. 1973).
47 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.4 (West 1973); id. § 2982(a) (West Supp. 1973);
see Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968);
Zmak v. Arata Pontiac, 265 Cal. App. 2d 689, 71 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1968).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.1 (West 1973); id. § 2983.7 (West Supp. 1973).
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Doctrine of Adhesion Contracts
The doctrine of adhesion contracts protects both the consumer
who is unaware of an oppressive contractual provision and the one
who is fully aware of the oppressive term but cannot bargain be-
cause of inferior economic strength. A contract of adhesion, by
definition,
refers to a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party
to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a con-
tract, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the drafts-
man and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the
second party on a "take it or leave it" basis, without opportunity
for bargaining and under such conditions that the 'adherer' cannot
obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the
form agreement. 49
In the California cases, however, the doctrine has been applied
only where the adhering party was unaware of the oppressive clause.50
If the dominant party gives clear and plain notification of the op-
pressive term, or does not use an ambigious term, California con-
sumers will find no remedy in this doctrine. 51
Inequality of Bargaining Power
Although the use of the doctrine of adhesion contracts is
relatively new in California, equality of bargaining power has long
been of importance in decisions based on "public policy" considera-
tions.52 It has been recognized that in normal market situations,
the average consumer deals with enterprises having vastly greater
economic resources. He normally enters the market in an unequal
position vis-A.-vis enterprises established to satisfy (and often stimu-
49. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 297, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 185 (1962); see Kessler, supra note 10, at 632-33.
50. See notes 93-94 infra.
51. See Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (1970). See text accompanying note 94 infra.
California consumers still have a variety of statutory remedies available. Indeed,
many of the cases decided m other jurisdictions on the basis of unconscionability could
have been disposed of in California by specific statute. Compare Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), with CAL. Crv. CODE §§
1808.1-.6 (West 1973). Also, California courts have found it unnecessary to discuss
the adhesive nature of a contract because some other principle of law provided protec-
tion for the consumer. See, e.g., California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Barrett Garages, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d 71, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1967).
52. See, e.g., Union Const. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 163 Cal. 298, 315,
125 P. 242, 248 (1912); Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 230,
107 P. 292, 298 (1910); Stephens v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 Cal. 86, 88, 41 P 783,
784 (1895); Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 373-74, 248 P 947, 951
(1926).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
late) his demand.53
Because of this inequality of economic strength, the consumer
does not enter the transaction with a great deal of power to affect
the nature of that transaction. Although he may have some power
to affect the price of the item, he likely will have little power to
modify the other terms of the contract. As industries grow, and as
the use of dealerships, franchises and industry-wide practices become
more prevalent, the impotence of the consumer is heightened by the
use of intermediaries in the chain of distribution. 54 For example, an
automobile dealer will bargain with a consumer over the price, but
the dealer often lacks any power to bargain away disclaimer provisions
provided by the manufacturer.5 5  Banks, 56 insurance companies,
"
1
7
finance companies,58 and common carriers59 have been found to be
dealing on an unequal basis with the average consumer.60 It is not
necessary, however, that the enterprise have a dominant market posi-
tion.6 Inequality may be created by the nature of the service offered
rather than by the economic strength of the dominant party Hos-
pitals612 and escrow companies,6 3 for example, have a superior bar-
53. See Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 158-59, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 287, 290-91 (1968). An inequality of bargaining power may also be created
by the wrongful conduct of the superior party. However, the doctrines of duress and
economic duress have been used m such a situation rather than adhesion doctrines.
See text accompanying notes 108-169 in!ra.
54. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 378-79, 161 A.2d
69, 80-81 (1960).
55. Id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 87
56. Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 14, 480 P.2d 320, 323, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 707 (1971); see LaSala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864,
877, 489 P.2d 1113, 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (1971).
57 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-70, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966).
58. See Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1968).
59. Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 370, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1971);
Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 332, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306
(1970).
60. In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., the district court of appeals held that a
disclaimer clause in the dealer's warranty would not effectively limit his liability for
personal injury caused by a defect in an automobile. The warranty is "no more than
a contract of adhesion. The bargaining position of the automobile dealer is over-
whelming as compared to the purchaser, who must take or leave an automobile "
34 Cal. Rptr. 723, 731-32 (1963). The Supreme Court, however, did not mention that
the warranty was a contract of adhesion, but rather based liability on a theory of stnct
liability m tort. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
61. Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 157, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287,
290 (1968).
62. Tunkl v. Regents of Umv. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
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gaining position not only because of their economic power, but also
because of the essential nature of their services. e4
Absence of a Meaningful Choice
In California, the "take it or leave it" nature of an adhesion
contract refers to the party's lack of opportunity to bargain away an
oppressive term because of lack of awareness or understanding of
that term."5 This reasoning assumes that if the consumer were made
aware of the unfair clause, he would be able to bargain it away or
could obtain similar goods or services elsewhere. These assumptions
may often be false.08
The excusable lack of knowledge of a contractual term may be
caused by the consumer's inability to read the contract before he
has committed himself. The purchaser of an airport vending mach-
ine insurance policy, 7 for example, is unable to read its provisions
(which are concealed within the machine) until the policy is pur-
chased; in addition, he is not provided with a copy of the policy to
guide his actions in the event of a change in itinerary.68
Because of the consumer's lack of economic clout, his only bar-
gaining weapon may be his ability to seek more favorable terms else-
where. However, the consumer soon learns that the market for many
products is controlled by a limited number of sellers, each offering
substantially the same product, price and terms. The consumer's
alternatives are thus narrowed. He must either purchase the product
at the seller's terms or not purchase the product at all. The nature
of the goods or services may eliminate the second alternative, how-
ever. The extreme example is the hospital patient who is handed
a printed form containing a provision releasing the hospital from
liability for its future negligence as a condition of admission.6" The
63. Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1968).
64. See text accompanying notes 69-73 infra.
65. In Lomanto v Bank of America, a couple alleged that a clause contained
in a deed of trust should not be enforced because of the adhesive nature of the instru-
ment. The husband had no cause of action because his subsequent activities indicated
he was aware of the provisions. The wife, however, may have a cause of action if
she was ignorant of the restrictive provision. 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1972).
66. Hennmgsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 390-91, 161 A.2d 69, 87
(1960).
67. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1962).
68. Id.
69. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
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dominant party in such a case is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the pub-
lic, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some mem-
bers of the public As a result of the essential nature of
the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against
any member of the public who seeks his services.70
California courts have recogmzed the practical necessity of the ser-
vices of an escrow company, a common carrier 72 and a bank.7"
Use of Standardized Contract
All California adhesion contract cases involve the use of printed
form contracts drafted by the superior party 74 Such contracts raise
several implications which have warranted the special attention of
the court.7 5 Standardized contracts are normally drawn by the domi-
nant contracting party and are therefore more likely to contain provi-
sions designed to protect his interests.76 Moreover, the nature and
form of the contract tend to put the consumer at a disadvantage.
Such contracts are often a maze of finely printed77 legal jargon which
the consumer is unlikely to read,78 and even less likely to under-
stand.79 Often, no effort is made to point out important provisions
which affect the consumer's rights under the contract.80 For exam-
70. Id. at 98-100, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
71. Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1968).
72. Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 87 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1970).
73. See Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1968).
74. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
75. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966); Kessler, supra note 10, at 631.
76. Kessler, supra note 10, at 631.
77 See, e.g., Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 1 Cal. 3d
562, 569, 463 P.2d 746, 751, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394, 399 (1970); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 883, 377 P.2d 284, 298, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185-86 (1962);
Lomanto v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 667, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442, 443
(1972).
78. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405, 410-11 (1967). Also, im-
portant terms may be hidden by imaginative drafting or obscure pnnting. Mellinkoff,
How to Make Contracts Illegible, 5 STAN. L. REv. 418 (1953).
79. Umco v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405, 410-11 (1967). Insurance
policy holders have long been assumed to be ignorant of the provisions of their poli-
cies or even the name of their insurance company. Because of their complexity, such
policies "may be veritable traps for the unwary." Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins.
Co., 157 Cal. 213, 230, 107 P 292, 298 (1910).
80. E.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962).
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ple, in Lomanto v. Bank of America," a trust deed containing a
provision in small print in a multi-page document was declared to be
a contract of adhesion. The plaintiffs alleged that they were not
aware of the provision because it was crowded in among numerous
other conditions and modified by so many clauses that it could not be
easily understood. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the bank
did nothing to call their attention to the provision, much less explain
its effect.
Similarly, many standardized contracts used by publicly regulated
enterprises incorporate limitations on their liability by reference to a
tariff on file in some public office. The exact terms of the limitation
are not provided in the document, but may be found only through
an examination of the tariff. The consumer thus is doubly handi-
capped: he may not realize that the stub he receives has contractual
implications, but even if he does, he will still be unaware of the
exact terms of the limitation. For example, bills of lading and ship-
per's receipts have been denominated contracts of adhesion. Attempts
by common carriers to limit their liability by the use of tariffs filed
with the appropriate regulatory agency are ineffective, unless adequate
notification is given to the customer.8 2
Limitations of the Adhesion Doctrine in California
The existence of a gross inequality of bargaining power be-
tween contracting parties does not mean that all resulting contracts
should not be enforced. The circumstances of each case must be
examined,8 3 together with a balancing of the needs of the consumer
and of the commercial commuMty. 84  The use of standardized con-
tracts arose to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding consumer-
goods oriented economy. If goods and services are to be distributed
efficiently and economically, standardized contracts must be used.8"
81. 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1972). The court commented that
the bank was under no duty to explain the provision if it was in the usual form of a
trust deed. Id. at 667, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
82. Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971); Muelder v.
Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970). This may
be limited to common carriers. The use of such limitations by a public utility was
upheld by another district court of appeals. Product Research Associates v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 651, 94 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971).
83. Taylor v. General Tel. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 70, 76, 97 Cal. Rptr. 349, 353
(1971).
84. See Tunkl v. Regents of Umv. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
85. This is not to say that the use of standardized contracts is an evil. There
are many advantages in such .contracts, they save time and trouble m bargaining, they
make sales administration sinpler and more efficient, they allow a concentration of
decision making m the most capable and trusted persons, such as managers and contract
However, the dominant party is not given license to abuse his power
in the name of convenience. Nonetheless, contracts of adhesion are
executed and enforced quite commonly, either because no conflict
arises over an oppressive term or because the contract imposes no
harsh provision on the weaker party
Even though the contractual terms are contained in a standard-
ized form, if it is clear that the agreement was the result of serious
negotiation, the adhesion doctrine does not apply Again, the cir-
cumstances under which the contract was formed must be examined.
While it is not clear how extensive such negotiations must be, the
fact that negotiations took place is evidence that the weaker party was
acting with some knowledge of the terms of the contract. The more
difficult problem is to reconcile the appearance of negotiation with
actual inability to affect the bargain. Serious negotiation on the terms
of a contract also casts doubt on the existence of an inequality of
bargaining power.8 6
The use of alternative limitations offered at reasonable differ-
ences in price may also remove the adhesive nature from the use of
a standardized form. However, the consumer must have actual or
constructive knowledge of the alternative and a fair opportunity to
obtain a less restrictive limitation at a lower price.A7  If these re-
quirements are met, the consumer cannot be said to lack a meaning-
ful choice, nor to be unaware of the terms of the contract he has
made. The contract is thus no longer adhesive as to him.
Since the distinguishing characteristic of adhesion contracts is
the gross inequality of bargaining power, the doctrine is not applic-
able when no inequality is found. For example, in Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v Douglas Aircraft Co.,88 Delta sought damages for injury to a
plane which crashed due to a malfunction of the nose wheel."9 A
draftsmen rather than salesmen. Furthermore, the savings from this specialization may
be passed on to the mass consumer. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv L. REV. 700,
701-02 (1939). Contracts formed through the use of such contracts may be enforced.
See Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367
(1969).
86. In Ury v Jewelers Acceptance Corp., the owner of a jewelry store sought
to have an agreement with his financier termed a contract of adhesion. The contract
however, was made after extensive negotiations, during which the advice of legal coun-
sel was available. The contract was not "one of those fine print specimens which
make comprehension of terms a fiction." Besides, the jeweler had read the contract.
227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 19, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376, 382 (1964).
87 Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971).
88. 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
89. Since no personal injury was involved, the theory of strict liability m tort
applied in Greenman v Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), did not apply. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 102, 47 Cal. Rptr. at
522-23.
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standardized contract of sale had been used wich contained a provi-
sion waiving Douglas's liability for accidents "whether of not oc-
casioned by Seller's negligence . . ."90 Delta sought to have the con-
tract declared adhesive, thus making the limitation ineffective, but the
court did not agree. Both parties to the contract were large corpora-
tions, and the contract was made after substantial negotiation at-
tended by Delta executives and attorneys. While the corporations
may not have been of equal size, the disparity in bargaining strength
did not affect their ability to bargain. 91 Similarly, in an action
against a warehouseman, an experienced businessman who regularly
used such services could not escape the effect of an excuplatory
provision in a warehouse receipt. His experience, as well as his
economic strength, placed hun on an equal footing with the other
party.92
Criticism of the Doctrine
As a remedy for the unwary consumer, the doctrine of adhesion
contracts will be of assistance only in limited circumstances. Thus
far, it is limited in application to standarized contracts between parties
of unequal strength winch contain either an ambigious provision or
a limitation on the liability of the dominant party 93 Moreover, the
90. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 101, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
91. Although the exculpatory clause was contained in a standard form, Delta was
aware of it and voluntarily agreed to the contract. Further, there was no evidence
that Delta could not have purchased an aircraft from another manufacturer on terms
not including the exculpation. The spectre of "industry-wide contracts" as used in
automobile sales was not raised. Compare id. at 103, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 523, with
Hennmgsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 390-91, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960).
92. The facts of Hischemoeller v. National Ice & Cold Storage Co., 46 Cal. 2d
318, 294 P.2d 433 (1956), were so distinguished in Muelder v. Western Greyhound
Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 332, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306-07 (1970). For other circum-
stances under which adhesion doctrines did not apply, see Century Bank v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 3d 319, 482 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1971)
(indemnity contract between bank and insurer); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp.,
62 Cal. 2d 40, 396 P.2d 377, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1964) (indemnity contract between
contractor and subcontractor); Oakland Bank of Commerce v. Washington, 6 Cal. App.
3d 793, 86 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1970) (experienced businessmen); Walnut Creek Pipe
Distrib., Inc. v. Gates Rubber Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964)
(jobber-distributor contract).
It is evident, however, that no hard and fast rule can be drawn delineating the
requisite inequality of bargaining power. For example, a contract of adhesion has
been found between a bank and three real estate co-venturers. Tahoe Nat'l Bank v.
Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1971); see Goldman v.
Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 396 P.2d 377, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1964).
93. See, e.g., Muelder v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 87
Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970); Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735,
74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969). The unambiguous provisions of an insurance policy will
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servient party must be unaware of the existence of the ambiguous term
or the limitation. If he is aware of the questioned provision, Calif-
ornia courts will enforce the contract despite its adhesory effect, even
if he would not have been able to understand the term had he in fact
read it. 4  He may have read and understood the term, yet still have
been powerless to bargain it away because of his lack of economic
strength. Nevertheless, the California adhesion doctrine does not
apply regardless of how unreasonably harsh the terms might be.
Unconscionability in Other Jurisdictions
In other jurisdictions, section 2-302 of the Uniform Commerical
Code, rather than the doctrine of adhesion contracts, is used to protect
the interests of the consumer. Both concepts, however, attempt to
prevent unfair advantage from being taken of persons entering a con-
tract with little or no bargaining power and with no meaningful
choice.9" The comment to section 2-302 suggests a broader test than
that used in contracts of adhesion cases:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract."6
More than an unequal bargaining relationship is required to find
a contract unconscionably oppressive. The courts in these jurisdic-
tions require a showing that some unfair advantage has been taken
over the consumer." The existence of this factor indicates that the
dominant party has obtained benefits (in higher price or otherwise)
while assuming no additional risks in performing his side of the deal,
and for which he has given little or nothing in return. Specific
"unconscionable" abuses will be dealt with in more detail in later
sections of this appendix. Of concern here is the interest that other
jurisdictions have shown in situations typified by unequal bargaining
strength and the absence of a meaningful choice.
When the ordinary consumer enters a market with a gross in-
equality of bargaining power, "the meaningfulness of choice essential to
be enforced regardless of its nature as a contract of adhesion. See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Flynt, 17 Cal. App. 3d 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1971).
94. See Lomanto v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442
(1972).
95. Compare Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966), with Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
96. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1 (1972 version).
97. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
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the making of a contract, can be negated ... 8. 9  His alternatives may
be further limited if he has very limited financial resources. One im-
portant application of the unconscionability doctrine in other jurisdictions
has been to give greater protection to persons living at or near the poverty
level.99 These consumers present a more dramatic instance of an eco-
nomic imbalance. Such persons may be particularly susceptible to the
high pressure tactics of unscrupulous merchants.100 The advancement of
credit to individuals who know they are poor credit risks may ef-
fectively preclude any desire to bargain for more favorable terms.
Since credit is not readily available elsewhere, they cannot afford to
shop around for more favorable terms.101 Furthermore, poverty is
often accompanied by noneconomic factors which restrict the ability
to bargain effectively, such as illiteracy, lack of education or a lan-
guage deficiency. 10 2
The most striking difference between the adhesion doctrine in
California and the unconscionability doctrine as applied in other juris-
dictions has been the application of the latter to protect persons
entering the market with these disabilities. A person with little edu-
cation may lack the expertise necessary to understand and cope with
the tactics of "unethical solicitors bent on capitalizing upon their
weakness . . . . ,I'3 The unconscionability standard was described
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co:104
[When a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real
choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or
no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or
even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to
all the terms. In such a case . . .the court should consider
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement
should be withheld.' 05
From the cases decided under 2-302, a new standard of know-
98. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
99. See Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Murphy, Law-
yers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 298, 305-15 (1969) (hereinafter
cited as Murphy].
100. See Murphy, supra note 99. See generally Project, The Direct Selling In-
dustry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 883 (1969).
101. Murphy, supra note 99, at 306-07.
102. Such persons may m general lack consumer skills. Project, The Direct
Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 883, 917-18 (1969).
103. Kugler v. Romam, 58 NJ. 522, 536, 279 A.2d 640, 648 (1971).
104. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
105. Id. at 449-50. But see Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 10 UCC REP. SERv.
139 (D.C. Ct. App., 1972) (consumer who had attained a doctor of philosophy de-
gree, had the capacity to acquaint himself with the terms of the contract); Capitol
Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Moms, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 321 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1970) (consumer was free to indulge in comparative shopping).
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ledge can be ascertained. The dominant party is obligated to dis-
close and perhaps to explain certain crucial terms of a contract "in
language that the least educated person can understand"'106 when it is
likely that a consumer will be unaware of or will not understand
them. If the seller fails to do so and instead seeks to take an un-
reasonable advantage, the restraint of unconscionability will be used
to protect the interests of the consumer.10 7
Duress and Economic Duress: Threats Made Against the Consumer
Where assent to a contract was gained through the use of un-
lawful economic or physical force or pressure, the consumer may use
the doctrine of duress to rescind the contract.'08 A finding of duress
allows the threatened consumer to rescind the contract even though
he may have had full knowledge of its terms. His consent is thought
to be involuntary because it was induced by the wrongful act of
another.
A pleading of duress puts at issue the capacity of the consumer
to withstand the threatened act and to consent freely despite the threat.
The court must determine whether the consumer's will was over-
come and whether his assent was not freely given. The capacity to
resist a threat is determined in part by his experience in the market,
the nature of the threatened action, and his knowledge of and ability
to explore other alternatives or legal remedies.
An intentional wrongful act by the dominant party must cause
apprehension in the threatened party It must be caused by some
specific act, not by mere speculation on the part of the threatened
party 010 One not actually put in apprehension of some harm by
the threatened action may not later claim that he acted under duress." 0
106. State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321,
3 UCC REP SERV. 775, 794 (Sup. Ct. 1966). But cf. Lomanto v. Bank of America,
22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1972) (if instrument, deed of trust, is in
usual form, the bank is under no duty to call attention to its provisions).
107 See State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303,
321, 3 UCC REP SERV. 775, 794 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
108. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1569-70 (West 1954). The terms duress and menace,
although of separate statutory derivation, are often used interchangeably. See Sistrom
v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 221, 124 P.2d 372, 376 (1942). When duress or
menace are found in contract formation, the remedy allowed is rescission of the
contract. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1566, 1689 (West 1954). See text accompanying notes
163 infra. Although these code provisions were enacted in 1872, "the courts have
seldom mentioned or applied them in the innumerable cases in which they could have
been invoked. Consequently, the language of the decisions can rarely be reconciled
with the statutory language." 17 CAL. JUR. 2d Duress § 4 (1956).
109. Goldstein v. Enoch, 248 Cal. App. 2d 891, 57 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1967).
110. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 36 Cal. App. 2d 494, 97 P.2d 982 (1940).
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Nor may one claim duress when his assent was given after his fear
had subsided.1 1
Even when a party consents to a contract while under an ap-
prehension of some economic or physical harm, however, he may not
have a valid defense to enforcement of the contract. It is not clear
whether California courts have adopted an objective or subjective
approach to determine whether the threatened party was justified in
acting in response to the threat."1 ' Under the objective test, this doc-
trine will be a valid defense only if a reasonably prudent man would
have perceived a threat to his interests and assented to a contract
to avoid the threat.11 3 Since a reasonable man is expected to know
and to assert any legal remedies available to him, the objective test
may lead to harsh results in many situations.1 4 Other California
courts have rejected the harsh objective standard and have instead
focused upon the state of mind of the actual party who assents under
pressure." 5 The question of the appropriate standard of behavior
of the weaker party remains undecided.
Economic Duress: Threats to Economic Interests
While the common law doctrine of duress may provide some
remedy to a consumer whose consent has been gained through the
use of threats of personal injury or property damage or confinement,
it is doubtful that the doctrine will be of great use to the consumer
in the ordinary market situation. There may well be extreme cases
of coercion in consumer transactions, but such cases are thought to
11. Stromberg v. Tanforan, 50 Cal. App. 1, 194 P 516 (1920).
112. Compare Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1959) (objective test), with Balling v. Finch, 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490
(1962) (subjective test). Confusion in the courts of appeals is further illustrated by
Goldstein v. Enoch, in which the court applied as its test "whether the defendant in-
tentionally exerted an unlawful pressure on the injured party to deprive him of con-
tractual volition and induce him to act to his own detriment." 248 Cal. App. 2d 891,
894-95, 57 Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (1967). Tins restrictive definition of duress was aban-
doned long ago in Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996 (1931). In Gott v.
Gott, the court advanced a dual test, "Mhe Califorma cases have adopted the modem
rule of the subjective test of duress under which duress is to be tested, not by the na-
ture of the threats, but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the victim; and
that whether the victim acted as a reasonably prudent person was a question for the
trier of facts." 270 Cal. App. 323, 327, 75 Cal. Rptr. 514, 516 (1969). See
McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal. App. 2d 371, 26 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1962); Lewis v. Fabn,
113 Cal. App. 2d 95, 247 P.2d 841 (1952).
113. See Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996 (1931); Steffen v. Re-
frigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 494, 205 P.2d 727 (1949).
114. See, e.g., Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
257, 206 P.2d 643 (1949).
115. See, e.g., Balling v. Finch, 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1962).
be rare.'16 The normal consumer may well feel coerced, but normal-
ly not because of some overt, wrongful act by the merchant. The
typical abuse is more likely to be an advantage taken of the static
relationship between the parties caused by inequalities of economic
strength." 7
California courts have expanded the common law doctrine of
duress into situations involving threatened pecumary or property
loss.'18 While physical threats may not be common in normal con-
sumer transactions, the consumer may more often feel some threat
to his economic interests. Although the limits of this doctrine have
not been clearly defined, generally required are some wrongful act
and the absence of an adequate remedy to protect one's interests
against the threatened harm. 19
Wrongfulness of a Threatened Act
Economic duress may be utilized when there has been a wrongful
act committed by the superior party which harms the economic in-
terests of the weaker party 120 To some extent, threats to property
interests are a normal part of the bargaimng process. For example,
one may threaten not to contract with another person unless the
bargain is in some way altered to his own advantage. Although this
may substantially affect the benefits to be derived from the transaction
by the threatened party, such a threat is not considered wrongful.' 21
However, an act may be so inappropriate that bargaining parties
should be free from such pressure. When the economic harm caused
116. See Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 883, 895 (1969).
117 It would seem that the use of duress to gain consent creates an extreme m-
equality of bargaining power. Not only are the parties not bargaining as equals, but
also there has been some affirmative action on the part of the dominant party that
effectively overcomes the will of the other party.
118. See Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942). The
wrongful detention of property until some demand is met will not be allowed as a
bargaining practice. This was known as duress of goods. Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139
Cal. App. 486, 34 P.2d 774 (1934); McTigue v. Arctic Ice Cream Supply Co., 20
Cal. App. 708, 130 P 165 (1912). A loss of property has been recognized as being
a sufficiently important interest that a threatened loss may effectively overcome a per-
son's will. However, a threat to pursue some legal action, such as the foreclosure of
a due mortgage, does not constitute duress. Burke v. Gould, 105 Cal. 277, 283, 38
P 733, 735 (1894).
119. Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237, 240 (1942)
[hereinafter cited as Dalzell].
120. See Goldstein v. Enoch, 248 Cal. App. 2d 891, 894-95, 57 Cal. Rptr. 19
22 (1967).
121. See, e.g., Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 603, 620-21 (1943); 40 CALIF L. REv. 425 (1952).
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by the wrongful act becomes significant, the threatened party is not
bargaining freely.
While a tortious or criminal act is no longer required for econ-
omic duress,'12  no clear defimtion of a wrongful act has yet been
advanced by the courts. While many threats, if carried out, may
themselves be actionable, 123 it is clear that such a standard is of no
help in reconciling economic duress cases. Since no particular threat
is, in itself, sufficiently wrongful to support a finding of economic
duress, California courts must currently evaluate threats to property
interests in light of surrounding circumstances 24  and "prevailing
community standards."'2 5  Such a test gives the courts great latitude
in determining when acts are so wrongful that they should not be
allowed as bargaining tactics, but as a tool for understanding Calif-
ornia economic duress cases, it is of little help.
As a general guideline, it has been suggested that economic
duress should be found when:
(1) Defendant has abused his superior bargaining position by
an improper threat to plaintiff's business or property interests
in order to force a disproportionate exchange of values;
(2) Plaintiff has acted as a reasonable man under the circum-
stances in submitting to the threat, was not previously under any
obligation to enter into the contract or pay over money, and his
action was taken solely to protect his business or property inter-
ests. x12
Actionable threats
While it may seem that a threat to do anything which would
give rise to a cause of action would be "wrongful," this standard has
not been adopted.127  It has often been mentioned that it is not
122. One of the first extensions of the duress doctrine to include economic
threats came in Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Papazian, 74 Cal. App. 231, 240 P. 47
(1925). Threats of physical destruction to a farmer's crops were made to induce him
to contract with a sellers' cooperative which would have set the price to be charged
for his crops. This case did not come within the traditional doctrine of duress of
goods. At the time, duress of goods was a detention of one's property until assent
was given to a contract.
123. For example, a threat to breach a contract gives rise to a cause of action for
damages when the contract is breached, but the threat itself does not constitute
economic duress. See text accompanying notes 134-36 infra. On the other hand, an
action would lie for a threat of physical injury. Such a threat would constitute duress.
McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal. App. 2d 371, 26 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1962).
124. See Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 204, 347 P.2d 12, 18-19, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 12, 18-19 (1959); Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 431, 298 P. 996, 998
(1931) (by reason of the "peculiar facts" of the case).
125. 40 CALiF. L. Riv. 425, 427 (1952).
126. Id. at 426.
127. See London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 240, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 262, 266 (1965).
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duress to threaten to do that which a person has a legal right to
do. 2 ' Although a breach of contract gives rise to an action for
damages, it is generally held that a person has a "legal right" to
threaten not to proceed under a contract and stand suit. 129  The
exercise of this legal right may not be wrongful even though the
breach may cause serious economic harm to the other party "I The
real basis for such a rule is to forestall suits arising subsequent to
every renegotiation of a contract.13' A person threatened by a breach
of a contract has a remedy- a cause of action on the contract. But
as often happens with the average consumer, the alternative may be
illusory He may be unable to pursue the alternative of a court
suit because of the expense involved, because of his ignorance of
available remedies, because of his immediate need for the product or
service, or because he is aware of the long delay and uncertainty
attendant to civil actions. 132  The threatening party is often fully
aware of the alternatives available to the other party By taking
advantage of the superior bargaining position created by the threat,
he is able to gain the consent of the weaker party 1'
For example, in London Homes, Inc. v Korn,13  a real estate
developer seeking to purchase real property chose to pay an additional
amount over the contract price when faced with the vendor's threat-
ened refusal to convey the property The developer's alternatives were
to pay the extra money, to forfeit the investment already made in
the project, or to tie up the project for several years while the matter
was being litigated23 5  The court refused to allow recovery of the
128. E.g., Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 770, 774, 236 P.2d
201, 204 (1951).
129. E.g., London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965); Fio Rito v. Fio Rito, 194 Cal. App. 2d 311, 14 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1961);
Nesbitt Fruit Prods., Inc. v. Del Monte Beverage Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 353, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1960); Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942);
see Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 770, 236 P.2d 201 (1951).
130. See, e.g., Goldstone-Tobias Agency, Inc. v. Barbroo Enterprises Prods., Inc.,
237 Cal. App. 2d 720, 47 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1965); Long v. Thompson, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 834, 148 P.2d 129 (1944).
131. See London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2(1 233, 241, 44 Cal. Rptr.
262, 267 (1965).
132. Dalzell, supra note 119. at 248, 367-82; see McTigue v. Arctic Ice Cream
Supply Co., 20 Cal. App. 708, 719, 130 P 165, 169 (1912) ("delay necessarily incident
to the recovery of the property by legal process would result in serious loss to the
owner of the property.") The alternative may be so unreasonable in light of the inter-
est threatened that a choice may be effectively precluded. See Leeper v. Beltrami,
53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959) (plaintiff paid worthless note
to prevent a foreclosure sale of her home).
133. See London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 241, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 267
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additional sum which he paid. It held that the vendor merely had
exercised a legal right to breach the contract and stand suit, and
that the developer's decision not to tie up his investment pending
resolution of such a suit was based upon good business judgment.13 6
However, such reasoning assumes that the plaintiff in such a case
can protect his interests adequately by pursuing clear-cut alternatives
that are readily available and recognizable. 137 When the court is
faced with circumstances under which the threatened loss of property
cannot be adequately remedied by filing suit, the courts have often
found economic complusion.138  In Young v. Hoagland,3 " a conflict
in the directorship of a corporation placed several stockholders in the
position of either paying assessments of questionable legality or risk-
ing the loss of their stock. In a suit to recover the assessments paid,
it was held that the stockholders had been induced to pay the money
by duress and that such duress exists where under "the peculiar facts
a reasonably prudent man finds that in order to preserve his property
or protect his business interests it is necessary to make a payment of
money which he does not owe and which in equity and good con-
science the receiver should not retain . . . "140 It may be reason-
able under the circumstances 4' for a person who is unable to bar-
gain on equal terms to submit to a demand rather than to allow a
seizure of his property. He may then sue to recover any payment
made to satisfy that demand. 42
Similarly in Thompson Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman,143 an
136. Id. at 239, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 266; see Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d
213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942).
137. Compare Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
257, 206 P.2d 643 (1949), with Lewis v. Fahn, 113 Cal. App. 2d 95, 247 P.2d 831
(1952). Both cases involved demands made by a lessor under threat of termination of
the lease. In Western Gulf Oil, the threatened lessee was not allowed to recover pay-
ments made because he had a declaratory judgment action available. However, eco-
nomic compulsion was found in Lewis without discussion of the availability of a de-
claratory judgment action.
138. Economic duress has been found even when an adequate remedy is tech-
mcally available, but under the circumstances a reasonable man would accede to the
demand rather than pursue that remedy. See Kolias v. Colligan, 172 Cal. App. 2d 384,
342 P.2d 265 (1959). In another case, the plaintiff was allowed to recover a payment
made to the threatening party while a suit was pending to determine the validity of
the .laum. The payment was the only way to prevent a serious economic loss from a
threatened cancellation of a contract. Wake Dev. Co. v. O'Leary, 118 Cal. App. 131,
4 P.2d 802 (1931).
139. 212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996 (1931).
140. Id. at 431, 298 P at 998.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 123 Cal. App. 2d 904, 267 P.2d 1043 (1954), noted in 28 S. CAL. L. REV.
317 (1955).
alternative was available, but the alternative was so unreasonable that a
reasonably prudent man would submit to the demand and later bring suit
to recover the payment.'44 An accountant demanded an additional per-
centage of the relief to be granted under a tax protest filed for his client,
and overcame the client's objections by reminding him that failure to
submit the protest on time would make him liable for the entire tax
assessment. Since the demand was made only two days before the al-
lowed period for filing the protest,145 it could not reasonably be said that
an adequate alternative (such as hiring a new accountant) was available
to the taxpayer. The acts of the accountant were sufficiently wrongful to
constitute duress, since he destroyed his client's power to bargain
freely by depriving him of the opportunity to exercise a meaningful
choice.
This inability to bargain on equal terms is present in other cases
which have found that the weaker party had acted reasonably in
submitting to an unfair demand made in violation of contractual
obligations. Payment of unearned interest under an acceleration
clause in order to gain release from a mortgage secured by the debtor's
home was held to be made under compulsion. The buyer was at-
tempting to sell the property to prevent a foreclosure. The finance
company refused to release the mortgage unless the unearned portion
of interest was paid. Recovery of the unearned portion was allowed.' 46
It should be noted that the cases discussed above all involve
either an illegal assessment or payments in excess of that amount due
under the original contract. Demands for payment due under a
contract, even if it would involve financial hardship, cannot be said
to be actionable economic duress.14 7 However, when an unreasonable
demand is made by one in a superior bargaining position under cir-
cumstances where a reasonable man would accede to the demand
in order to avoid some pecuniary loss, economic duress will be
144. Id.
145. The protest had taken the accountant 40 days to prepare. He made his
demand on the Saturday prior to the Monday the protest had to be filed. Also the
accountant made assurances that the claims against the client were asinine. This could
only have heightened the client's apprehension of loss. The ultimate assessment against
the taxpayer was only $2,500. Id.
146. Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 494, 205 P.2d 727
(1949); see Oswald v. City of El Centro, 211 Cal. 45, 292 P 1073 (1930); Kolias v.
Colligan, 172 Cal. App. 2d 384, 342 P.2d 265 (1959); LaTelle v. American Trust
Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 830, 149 P.2d 385 (1944); Texas Co. v. Todd, 19 Cal. App. 2d
174, 64 P.2d 1180 (1937).
147 See London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965). But see Thompson Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 904,
909, 267 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1954) ("A very real compulsion appears, which is no less
real because an incidental breach of contract was also involved.")
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found.14  If this is to be a useful standard, it must be concluded
that the circumstances presented in London did not render the defend-
ant's threats improper as judged by "prevailing community stand-
ards. 1 40 In California, economic duress has been found only when
some demand has been made in excess of or in conflict with exist-
ing obligations.18 0 But there is no reason for a distinction on that
basis between Thompson and London. Both involved a refusal to
proceed as originally agreed unless greater demands were met, and
the creation of an unequal bargaining position by the threatened non-
performance of the breaching party. In both cases, the weaker party
was placed in a position of dependence by the prior actions of the
breaching party.
Nonactionable Threats
A threat to do or not to do something which is not an actionable
wrong generally is not sufficiently wrongful to constitute duress. 151
Within this category are threats to pursue a legal remedy. Even
though the threat may effectively overcome volition, the nature of the
threatened action is not considered "unlawful" and therefore not a
basis for an action for duress. For example, a threat to foreclose a
mortgage or to bring suit on a debt or obligation presently due is
not coercion or intimidation sufficient to overcome volition at law.',,
That the suit or foreclosure would result m financial embarrassment,
ill health, mental distress, or loss of profits is not sufficient to render
such threats wrongful.' 53
If a threat to pursue a legal remedy is used to gain assent, how-
ever, the remedy must be based on a claim held in good faith. If
the threatening party is acting in bad faith by asserting an unfounded
148. See, e.g., Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 298 P. 996 (1931).
149. 40 CAun. L. REv. 425, 427 (1952).
150. See, e.g., Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 494,
205 P.2d 727 (1949).
151. See Dalzell, supra note 119, at 362-63.
152. C.I.T. Corp. v. Hawley, 34 Cal. App. 2d 66, 93 P.2d 216 (1939); Santa
Ana Sugar Co. v. Smith, 116 Cal. App. 422, 2 P.2d 866 (1931); accord, Manposa
Co. v. Bowman, 16 F Cas. 755 (No. 9,089) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (threat to cloud title);
Sabella v. Litchfield, 274 Cal. App. 2d 195, 78 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1969) (threat to
picket); Del Carlo v. County of Sonoma, 245 Cal. App. 2d 36, 53 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1966) (threat to enforce a lien); Fio Rito v. Fio Rito, 194 Cal. App. 2d 311, 14
Cal. Rptr. 845 (1961) (threat to divorce); Silberschmidt v. Moran, 79 Cal. App. 533,
250 P. 205 (1926) (threat of attachment).
153. Kohler v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 26 Cal. 606 (1864); Goldstone-Tobias Agency,
Inc. v. Barbroo Enterprises Prods., Inc., 237 Cal. App. 2d 720, 47 Cal. Rptr. 347
(1965); Pugh-Miller Drilling Co. v. Main Oil Co., 98 Cal. App. 297, 276 P. 1043
(1929).
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claim, such a threat amounts to duress.154  But if a claim is asserted
m good faith, although not well founded, the preponderance of
authority is that duress is not present. 1 5
Under certain circumstances, it may be a serious injustice not
to allow a rescission for duress because of a threat to commit a
nonactionable wrong. A standard based on an analysis of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the threatened act would allow the doctrine
of economic duress to protect the rights of the buyer in a situation
where the threatening party was pursuing some "legal right."
In California, there have been a few exceptions to the rule that
a threat to commit a nonactionable wrong is not duress. Such
decisions bear out the applicability of the test for duress that there
be a disproportionate exchange, an unequal bargaining position and
a threat considered wrongful in view of the circumstances of the
case. For example in Rowland v Watson,'56 the plaintiff sued to
recover money paid in excess of the amount due on a promissory
154. For example, in Leeper v Beltrami, a woman was under pressure to pay a
forfeited bond for $10,000 secured by her home. In order to raise money, she at-
tempted to sell other ranch properties. The defendants instituted an action to foreclose
a previously cancelled mortgage on the ranch properties. Because of the cloud on the
title and the impending foreclosure on her house, the woman felt forced to sell one of
the properties for one-third of its value. In order to sell the second property the
woman paid the mortgage. Later she filed suit to recover that amount and also the
property from the first purchaser who had taken advantage of her financial plight.
The court allowed recovery of the mortgage payment because of economic duress.
Although the woman had an alternative of allowing her house to be sold at the
foreclosure sale, such was not a reasonable alternative. The use of a known false
claim to gain consent amounted to duress. Although the third party purchaser had
taken no part m the threats, he had "no legal right to take advantage, knowingly, of
the wrongdoing of third parties." 53 Cal. 2d 195, 206, 347 P.2d 12, 20, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 12, 20 (1959); accord, Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 329 F Supp. 211
(N.D. Cal. 1971); McNichols v. Nelson Valley Bldg. Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 721,
218 P.2d 789 (1950) (filing a lis pendens solely to cloud title and prevent a sale);
Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 494, 205 P.2d 727 (1949)
(threat of foreclosure used to force payment of unearned interest); Ezmirlian v. Otto,
139 Cal. App. 486, 34 P.2d 774 (1934) (use of known, false claim solely to cloud
title and force payment of claim); McTigue v. Arctic Ice Cream Supply Co., 20
Cal. App. 708, 130 P 165 (1912) (detention of property used to force an illegal de-
mand); International Fishermen & Allied Workers v. Stemland, 97 Cal. App. 2d
931, 219 P.2d 554 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1950) (threat of strike used to force
owner to pay fines of others).
155. Dalzell, supra note 119, at 346; see, e.g., Fio Rito v. Fio Rito, 194 Cal.
App. 2d 311, 14 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1961) (plaintiff asserted what he thought to be a
reasonable position). "It is not duress, however, to take a different view of contract
rights, even though mistaken, from that of the other contracting party, and it is not
duress to refuse, in good faith, to proceed with a contract, even though such refusal
might later be found to be wrong." London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d
233, 240, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262, 266(1965).
156. 4 Cal. App. 476, 88 P 495 (1906).
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note. When the note was due, they agreed to a two-month exten-
sion with an additional bonus of fifty dollars for each month the
loan was unpaid. Later the defendant demanded fifty dollars for
each of sixteen months while the note was unpaid. While the de-
fendant was asserting this claim in good faith, he was also taking
advantage of his knowledge that the plaintiff stood to suffer severe
financial loss if he could not gain release from all his creditors.
The court concluded that under the extension contract, the fifty
dollar bonus applied only to the two months' extension originally
agreed upon and not to subsequent extensions. Therefore, pay-
ments in excess of the amount due, even in satisfaction of a claim
asserted in good faith, were paid under complusion to avoid financial
loss and could be recovered.
157
Similarly, a threat to refuse to enter into a contract is not an
actionable wrong, nor is it generally the basis for economic duress." 8
To allow such a threat to constitute duress would involve a severe
restructuring of traditional notions of freedom of contract. How-
ever, there are exceptions to this rule under circumstances involving
the "use of unequal bargaining power to force a person in an un-
usually distressing situation to agree to hard contract terms .... -159
For example in Oswald v. City of El Centro,160 duress was found in
a threat to refuse to modify an existing contract between the parties.
When it became obvious that the contractor would be unable to
finish a paving job before the deadline, the contractor appeared be-
fore the board of trustees of the city to request an extension of time.
Such extensions were given as a matter of course if performance under
the contract was being carried out diligently. The board, however,
refused to approve the request unless the contractor would agree to
lease valuable property to the city for ten years at one dollar per
157. Id. at 481, 88 P at 497; see Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91
Cal. App. 2d 494, 205 P.2d 727 (1949). Compare Millsap v. National Funding
Corp., 57 Cal. App. 2d 772, 135 P.2d 407 (1943), with Powis v. Moore Machinery
Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 344, 164 P.2d 822 (1945). Both cases involved agreements made
between an employer and an employee under threat of discharge. Although both
employees had employment agreements terminable at will, economic duress was found
in Millsap but not m Powis. The cases can be recorkciled only on the basis of the
difference in the bargaining power of the two employees. In Powts, the employee was
a successful salesman earning $41,000 the previous year. The court speculated that he
may have signed the agreement knowing that his income would be larger neverthe-
less. However, in Millsap the employee earned only $35 per week as a notary and
had no unique skills which would have enabled her to bargain effectively with her
employer.
158. See, e.g., Konecko v. Konecko, 164 Cal. App. 2d 249, 330 P.2d 393 (1958);
Standard Box Co. v. Mutual Biscuit Co., 10 Cal. App. 746, 103 P 938 (1909).
159. Dalzell, supra note 119, at 360.
160. 211 Cal. 45, 292 P 1073 (1930).
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year. 6' The contractor agreed but later brought suit to have the
lease rescinded. Refusing to enforce the lease, the court concluded
that his consent was "[c]learly the product of compulsion and
the employment of coercive methods by which the exercise of freedom
of will, which is always essential to a valid contract, was unquestion-
ably overcome ",162
Economic Duress and Unconscionability
The doctrine of economic duress has several shortcomings. First,
the only remedy permitted in California duress cases has been com-
plete rescission of the agreement. However, the weaker party may
want the contract enforced, but without an oppressive term.' 63 More-
over, the unclear standard of "wrongful" acts yields little protection
for the consumer faced with a serious abuse of superior power in
bargaining. The doctrine also fails to recogmze that there can be
pressure created by a lawful act of the dominant power, from which
the weaker party is entitled to be free.' 4
The application of the unconscionability doctrine m economic
duress situations has been utilized to allow the nonenforcement of
either the entire contract or only an unconscionable portion of it.'" 5
The semantic wrangles of defining "wrongful" actions constituting
duress are also avoided by the doctrine of unconscionability; instead
there is perhaps an equally tenuous examination of the "economic
positions of the parties and a finding that the position of one was
so vulnerable as to make him the victim of a grossly unequal bar-
161. Because of the nomnal value of the rent, the element of inadequate con-
sideration was present. Id. at 52, 292 P at 1076.
162. Id. Duress was also present in an act used solely to interfere with the
plaintiff's contractual relations with another. See Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal. App.
486, 34 P.2d 774 (1934). If the threatened party knows that the demand made by
the threatening party is illegal or not well-founded, but nevertheless satisfies the de-
mand under some additional compulsion, he may recover any payments. Sufficient
compulsion is found when a person wrongfully detains another's property and "the de-
lay necessarily incident to the recovery of the property by legal process would result
in serious loss to the owner of the property." McTigue v. Arctic Ice Cream Supply
Co., 20 Cal. App. 708, 719, 130 P 165, 169 (1912).
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689 (West 1973).
164. Professor Dalzell suggests that a threat should be considered wrongful based
not on whether it is actionable by itself, but rather on whether it fits within one of
these categories: "(1) a threat to commit an actionable wrong; (2) a threat to misuse
a legal power given for other legitimate ends; (3) a threat to maintain a lawsuit or
defense which ultimately proves to be unsustainable; (4) a threat to violate the
standards of decent conduct in the community." Dalzell, supra note 119, at 366;
see Burke v. Gould, 105 Cal. 277, 38 P 733 (1894).
165. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1).
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gain."'" In the case of In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 1 67
the referee in bankruptcy refused to enforce a contract between a
creditor and the bankrupt because the referee thought the contract
was unconscionable. Several months before bankruptcy, the creditor
had entered into the contract with Elkins-Dell. The creditor was to
advance 75 percent of the accounts assigned to it, but the creditor
retained the power to choose those accounts which it would accept.
Elkins-Dell on the other hand, was restricted from seeking financ-
ing elsewhere and from disposing of any assets without the con-
sent of the creditor. The creditor reserved the power to receive,
open and dispose of all mail addressed to Elkins-Dell. In short,
the transacion "spelled ruin to the bankrupt .... ,,168 The court
hesitated, but declined to enforce the contract because of insufficient
evidence of the commercial need for such a contract. The agree-
ment, though apparently harsh and one-sided, must be evaluated
in terms of the needs of the creditor to protect his interests when
dealing with a debtor of questionable financial strength and in view
of the needs of other debtors similarly situated who are in need of
credit. The court remanded the claim to the referee for further pro-
ceedings to determine the commercial context out of which such a
contract arose. The standard to be applied to determine the un-
conscionability of such a case requires that "there must be a showing,
not only that the terms of the contract are onerous, oppressive, or
one-sided, but also that the terms bear no reasonable relation to
the business risks. This is a showing that depends on the commercial
environment and cannot be made from the face of a contract alone."' 9
Undue Influence
The doctrine of undue influence is available to consumers in
certain situations when they have been induced to assent to a con-
tract by the use of tactics not sufficiently wrongful to constitute
duress.27 0  However, as a remedy for the consumer in the ordinary
transaction involving inequality of bargaining power, this doctrine
will be of little use.
166. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
167 253 F Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
168. Id. at 866.
169. Id. at 873.
170. 'To make a good contract a man must be a free agent. Pressure of what-
ever sort which overpowers the will without convincing the judgment is a species of
restraint under which no valid contract can be made. Importunity or threats, if car-
ned to the degree in which the free play of a man's will is overborne, constitute undue
influence, although no force is used or threatened. A party may be led but not driven,
and his acts must be the offspring of his own volition and not the record of someone
else's.' Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 130, 54 Cal.
Rtpr. 533, 540 (1966).
Although California Civil Code section 1575 seems to provide
a remedy in some situations where unfair advantage has been taken
of the consumer, California case law has failed to extend the lan-
guage to that extent. 171 By statute, undue influence consists:
1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another,
or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, of such confi-
dence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advan-
tage over him;
2. In taking unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or,
3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's
necessities or distress. 172
It would seem that this definition of undue influence would be
of great help to consumers unable to resist high pressure tactics be-
cause of lack of education, inexperience, or poverty However, the
doctrine of undue influence has been limited m application to ex-
treme situations m which a person relied upon and trusts another
to such an extent that he is in a completely subservient state of
mind.' 71 Such a relationship reveals that there has not been a bar-
gain in any real sense of the word. Nonetheless, it is an attempt
to deal with a complete lack of knowledge; normal market trans-
actions, however, are not evidenced by such complete subservience.
A confidential relationship exists when one person stands in a
special position of trust and deference to another. 174 Because of this
relationship, the party's advice and counsel bear added weight. In
an intimate relationship such as between relatives, friends or an
attorney and his client, 175 the possibility of abusing this position of
trust may be particularly great because of the deference accorded the
advice given by the dominant person. Although merchants may
attempt to gain the "confidence" of potential buyers, it is clear that
the doctrine of undue influence will apply only in extreme situations.
The language of Odorizzi v Bloomfield School District 76 seemed
to expand the. scope of the doctrine of undue influence. An element-
171. "The courts have seldom resorted to this code provision [California Civil
Code section 1575] and have used language concerning undue influence which
is difficult to harmonize with the statutory language. In fact it has been said
that the courts will not attempt to define undue influence by any fixed principles, lest
the definition itself point out the way by which it may be evaded." 17 CAL. JURa. 2d
Duress § 11, at 11-12 (1968).
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (West 1954). The remedy available for any agree-
ment reached through the use of undue influence is rescission. Id. § 1566; id.
§ 1689 (West 1973).
173. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 89, 81 Cal. 195, 22 P 589 (1889).
174. See, e.g., Kloehn v. Prendiville, 154 Cal. App. 2d 156, 316 P.2d 17 (1957).
175. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P.2d 220 (1937);
Faulkner v. Beatty, 161 Cal. App. 2d 547, 327 P.2d 41 (1958); McDougall v. Roberts,
43 Cal. App. 553, 185 P 483 (1919).
176. 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966).
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ary school teacher was arrested on charges of homosexual conduct
and endured forty sleepless hours of processing and interrogation
by police. Shortly after he was released on bail, he was visited by
the principal and superintendent of the school district. They in-
formed him that unless he signed a resignation at once, they would
find it necessary to dismiss him for improper conduct.17 7 Based on
their representations178 as to the need for haste, their desire only to
help him personally, and the dire consequences of his refusal, the
teacher signed the resignation.
When the criminal charges were later dropped, the teacher sued
for declaratory relief and rescission of the resignation. The court
rejected the claim for duress, 79 but held that the complaint stated a
cause of action for undue influence. 180 Although no confidential
relationship was found between the parties,' 8 ' such a relationship
"need not be present when the undue influence involves unfair ad-
vantage taken of another's weakness or distress."' 82  Undue influence
was found in the school officiars use of "overpersuasion and im-
position to secure plaintiff's signature but not his consent to his
resignation .... 183
Since overpersuasion seems to be a common problem for con-
sumers in high pressure sales campaigns, this language would seem
significant for consumer actions. Overpersuasion and undue in-
fluence are very closely related. 84 Of concern is that type of per-
suasion that "tends to be coercive in nature . . which overcomes
the will without convincing the judgment. The hallmark of such
persuasion is high pressure .. .. "185 The relative strength of the
parties is important in determining whether persuasion has overcome
the will of the assenting party. Even though the school officials
were not responsible for the teacher's physical and mental strain,
they were aware of it and used it to their advantage. This kind
of situation created a position of dominance over the teacher, whose
will was overcome against judgment. 8 '
The type of persuasion referred to in Odorizzi is generally ac-
177. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13409 (West 1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1973).
178. Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 127, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 538 (1966).
179. Id. at 128, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
180. Id. at 135, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
181. Id. at 129, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
182. Id. at 130, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
183. Id. at 135, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
184. Kelly v. McCarthy, 6 Cal. 2d 347, 364, 57 P.2d 118, 126 (1936); Odorizzi
v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (1966).
185. OdonzzA v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 539 (1966).
186. "In essence undue influence involves the use of excessive pressure to persuade
one vulnerable to such pressure applied by a dominant subject to a servient object.
companied by such characteristics as the consummation of the trans-
action at an unusual time or place, often with an emphasis on
haste and the consequences of delay, the use of several persuaders
operating together, and the absence of third party advisors-accom-
pained perhaps by statements that there "isn't time" for attorneys or
financial advisors.'1 7  It is clear, however, that the court had no in-
tention that consumer transactions would normally fit into this pat-
tern. Undue influence is not to be used to avoid bad bargains or to
provide a consumer with a remedy for a contract "about which
[he has] second thoughts."'' 8  It is doubtful, therefore, that the
doctrine of undue influence will be of much use in ordinary market
situations which are characterized by lesser degrees of powerless-
ness and ignorance than in the typical undue influence case.' 9
These characteristics, however, may be present in grossly unfair
consumer contracts. When excessive pressure is used by the domi-
nant party and the will of the servient person is overcome, these
factors should be applicable, and the doctrine of undue influence
may be available.
The Second Factor Enumerated in Section 5108
Knowledge by Those Engaging in the Practice of the Inability of
Consumers to Receive Benefits Properly Anticipated from the
Goods or Services Involved
This second criterion pertinent to the issue of unconscionability
In combination, the elements of undue susceptibility in the servient person and ex-
cessive pressure by the dominating person make the latter's influence undue, for it
results in the apparent will of the servient person being in fact the will of the dominant
person.
Whether a person of subnormal capacities has been subjected to ordi-
nary force or a person of normal capacities subjected to extraordinary force, the match
is equally out of balance. If will has been overcome against judgment, consent may be
rescinded." Id. at 131-32, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41.
187 Id. at 133, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 541. These factors were applied in a case de-
cided under a similar factual situation involving the resignation of a police officer after
charges of rape. All the elements except the reference to haste were present, and the
contract of resignation was rescinded. Keithley v. Civil Serv. Bd., 11 Cal. App. 3d 443,
89 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1970).
188. 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 132, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 541 (1966). For a discus-
sion of the use of high pressure techniques in door-to-door sales, see Project, The
Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV 883 (1969).
189. "A woman who buys a dress on impulse, which turns out to be less
fashionable than she had thought, is not legally entitled to set aside the sale on the
ground that the saleswoman used all her wiles to close the sale. A man who buys a
tract of desert land in the expectation that it will become another Palm Springs,
an expectation cultivated in glowing terms by the seller, cannot rescind his bargain
when things turn out differently." Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal.
App. 2d 123, 132, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 541 (1966).
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focuses on the seller's knowledge that the goods or services may not
meet the expectations of the consumer. While the first criterion
centered on the consumer's lack of knowledge, 9 0 the second is con-
cerned with the seller's knowledge of the inadequacy of the goods
or services. The seller here is not charged with warranting the goods
for all purposes. Instead, only his knowledge of the inability of the
goods to meet those benefits properly anticipated indicates a possibly
unconscionable situation. His knowledge that the goods or services
may not operate perfectly, although they satisfy the reasonable ex-
pectations of consumers, would not be unconscionable.
To determine those benefits properly anticipated invokes an ob-
jective investigation into the nature of the contract and of the goods
or services to be derived therefrom.19' In our consumer-oriented
economy, the use of standardized contracts and standardized products
is essential for the efficient and economical distribution of goods
and services.' 92 Sellers in such markets sell to the average consumer,
not to each individual. They seek to satisfy the expectations of a
broad range of individuals. The seller's knowledge that an individual has
unreasonable expectations is not, per se, unconscionable, provided that
no misrepresentations have been made regarding the adequacy of the
product for the purpose sought.
Even when there has been no misrepresentation made by the
seller, criterion two may offer some protection to the consumer.
When the seller knows of the inadequacy of the goods or services
and says nothing, such knowledge would be unconscionable.' 93 The
fact that the seller is aware of the inadequacy of the goods or services
places him in a superior bargaining position in relation to the con-
sumer.
While it is clear that a seller's actions calculated to deceive the
consumer are unconscionable (and perhaps fraudulent),9 4 there may
also be situations in which the seller does not intend to deceive the
190. See text accompanying notes 13-189 supra.
191. "Grossly unfair contractual obligations . which result in assumption by
the other contracting party of a burden which is at odds with the common under-
standing of the ordinary and untrained member of the public, are considered uncon-
scionable and therefore unenforceable." Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J.
528, 554, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (1967). A similar standard has been applied in con-
struing ambiguities m insurance policies so as to effect the reasonable expectations of
the insured. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962).
192. See text accompanying notes 74-82 supra.
193. See CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1572 (West 1954).
194. Ach v. Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477
(1968).
consumer, but is aware that the terms of the contract operate to his
advantage and to the disadvantage of the consumer. The consumer
may well be unaware of the harshness of the contract because of
his failure to read or to understand the contract. Further, the terms
may be hidden in a maze of fine print or couched m legal jargon
unfathomable to the average consumer.19 While the seller is aware of
the true nature of the contract he is using, the consumer may be
anticipating something quite different based upon the seller's repre-
sentations or upon his own understanding of those parts of the con-
tract that are obvious and understandable. a 6 While an attempt at
overreaching combined with conscious efforts to obfuscate the harsh
clauses is unconscionable,' 97 the use of standardized clauses does not
necessarily evidence a conscious effort to defeat the normal expecta-
tion of the consumer.' 98
A seller may honestly attempt to protect himself by inserting
favorable terms into the contract and relying upon the consumer to
protect his own interests.'99 A hidden ambiguity m a term inserted
by the seller for his own protection may enable the consumer to
interpret the term to his own advantage.2 °° Similarly, there may
be characteristics of the goods or services themselves which are known
to the seller but are not obvious to the buyer. While such activities
may not evidence a fraudulent intent to deceive, the consumer never-
theless may deserve protection. To the extent that the courts have
begun to recognize that the seller is under a duty to disclose all perti-
nent facts of the transaction to the consumer, 20 1 the failure to dis-
close may result in liability for the seller if he attempts to gain a
greater advantage than the consumer has a right to anticipate. Thus,
a seller who fails to acquaint the consumer with the terms of the
contract may find that the court will discard those terms or will
construe them in a way which protects the consumer's interests.20 2
195. Umco v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405, 410-11 (1967); Note,
Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REV. 494 (1950).
196. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Urdang v. Muse, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1220 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1971).
197 For example, the facts may indicate that knowing advantage was taken of
the consumers. E.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
198. See Umco v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405. 411 (1967).
199. E.g., Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1971); see Murray v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 248, 58
Cal. Rptr. 273 (1967).
200. E.g., State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966); 79 HARV. L. REv. 1299, 1301-02 (1966).
201. See State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
202. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
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One of the benefits a consumer anticipates from the goods or
services purchased is that the value of their use to him approximates
their cost. The unconscionability of gross disparity between price
and value is discussed in greater detail below 203 However, the seller
generally knows the true value of the goods or services, based on a
full knowledge of the risks accepted and the terms of the contract.
When the seller takes advantage of the poverty, illiteracy, poor credit
standing, or lack of knowledge of the risks contemplated by the con-
sumer and is able to charge a considerably higher price than the
product is worth, he is necessarily aware that the consumer will be
unable to benefit from the product in a way which is reasonably
proportional to the price.2 0 4 To the extent that such a seller attempts
to obtain greater advantage than is legitimately related to the risks he
is assuming, is knowledge will render his activity unconscionable.
The opportunity for abuse of the superior bargaining position
is inherent in a situation where the seller is the only party aware of
the true nature of the goods or services the consumer is receiving.
Similarly, the fact that the seller is aware that the consumer will not
be able to receive those benefits he properly anticipates clearly indi-
cates an abuse of the seller's superior bargaining position. Such
abuse indicates unconscionability under criterion two.
The Third Factor
Gross Disparity between the Price of Goods and Services and
Their Value as Measured by the Price at which Similar Goods
Are Readily Obtainable by Other Consumers, or by Other Tests
of True Value
In California, as elsewhere, the mere existence of a difference
between the price and the true value of an object is not a ground for
refusal to enforce the contract.20 5  Inadequacy of consideration is
generally not a defense to a contract voluntarily made. If, however,
the disparity becomes so gross that there is a strong likelihood of
fraud, or if the disparity is present with other inequitable circum-
stances, the contract will not be enforced. 06 California courts have
long recognized that a gross inadequacy of consideration may be
evidence of fraud, undue influence or duress.20 7  Further, in an
action for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff has the
203. See text accompanying notes 205-238 infra.
204. See Kugler v. Romam, 58 NJ. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
205. Whelan v. Swam, 132 Cal. 389, 64 P. 560 (1901); Taylor v. Taylor, 66
Cal. App. 2d 390, 152 P.2d 480 (1944).
206. See 42 CALw. L. REv. 345, 346 (1954).
207. See Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 206, 347 P.2d 12, 20, 1 Cal. Rptr.
12, 20 (1959); Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P.2d 220 (1937).
responsibility to show that the consideration bargained for was
"just and reasonable. 2 s0 8
In State Finance Co. v Smith, 09 a buyer gave a $300 note
for payment for a used truck. After the vehicle was delivered, the
buyer discovered it was worth about $25 as junk, even though the
previous owner had represented it to be in good condition. The
court held the difference between price and value was so great as
to be evidence of fraud.21 0 The consideration given was not merely
inadequate, but was so grossly inadequate "as to shock the con-
science and common sense of all men . "11 After finding the
transaction unconscionable because the truck was so outrageously
overpriced, the court refused to allow the seller to recover on the
note.
21 2
Smith demonstrates the general equity power the California
courts exercise when deciding whether the terms of a contract merit
enforcement.213  There seems to be no one standard to gauge the
effect of an inadequacy of consideration. Since the degree of m-
adequacy vanes with the circumstances as well as with the dollar
amount of the disparity between price and value, the effect of the
inadequacy operates along a continuum; as the disparity between
price and value becomes grosser, the inadequacy becomes more
significant. This continuum has been described as initially treating
an inadequacy of consideration:
"as corroborative evidence of fraud or undue influence [or duress] 214
which will enable a promisor to resist a suit for specific performance
or have his agreement set aside. Where mental weakness occurs in
connection with inadequacy of consideration, the presumption of
undue influence becomes very strong [W]here the parties
stand in a confidential relation, inadequacy of price will raise a
presumption of fraud." Inadequacy of consideration may be so
excessively gross and unconscionable as to amount to conclusive evi-
dence of fraud.21 5
The existence of fraud, duress or undue influence, combined with
208. Eichholtz v. Nicoll, 66 Cal. App. 2d 67, 151 P.2d 664 (1944); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3391 (West 1970).
209. 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941).
210. Id. at 691-92, 112 P.2d at 903.
211. Id. at 691, 112 P.2d at 903.
212. Id. at 693, 112 P.2d at 904.
213. See Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135 P.2d 179 (1943). The
court refused to enforce an option clause in a contract where there was no benefit
moving to the defendant because the terms were "so harsh and unjust that the court
could not hold that it was [within the] contemplation of the parties " Id. at
689, 135 P.2d at 181-82.
214. See Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959).
215. Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 476, 71 P.2d 220, 253 (1937),
quoting from 13 C.1 Contracts § 239 (1917).
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an inadequacy of consideration makes the evidence of unconscionable
advantage very strong. Absent evidence of other inequitable circum-
stances, inadequacy of consideration standing alone is not sufficient
evidence of fraud to set aside a contract, 16 unless, as stated above, the
disparity is so gross as to shock the conscience of the court.217
It is clear, therefore, that California courts have gone beyond the
traditional clich6 that inadequacy of consideration is not a relevant de-
fense to contract formation. However, as an aid in unconscionable
consumer contracts, the California cases are of little help in predicting
the course to be taken. Because of the paucity of California cases
setting aside contracts because of inadequacy of consideration amount-
ing to fraud, the doctrinal basis of the cases is uncertain. 218  While a
contract containing grossly inadequate consideration will be closely
scrutinized, it is not clear how great a disparity must be present to be
termed grossly inadequate. The cases of other jurisdictions which
have more closely analyzed the circumstances of contract formation
are illustrative of the use of the unconscionability doctrine.
Since no definite quantitative standards can be suggested for a
determination of inadequacy, trial courts in other jurisdictions must de-
cide this question based on the circumstances surrounding contract
formation and the numerical disparity itself.219 Of importance are
circumstances indicating that an unfair advantage has been taken over
one of the parties. A mathematical disparity alone is not sufficient
to render the contract unenforceable, since a disparity is not by itself
unconscionable. 220  Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code
grants power to the court to determine that a contract is unconscion-
216. 42 CALIF. L REV. 345, 347 (1954). For example, in Smith there was evi-
dence that the buyer had relied upon the seller's misrepresentations as to the condition
of the truck. 44 Cal. App. 2d at 691, 112 P.2d at 903.
217. Weger v. Rocha, 138 Cal. App. 109, 115, 32 P.2d 417, 420 (1934). The
real basis for denying enforcement to contracts attended by inadequacy of consideration
is not the disparity itself, but the fraud evidenced by the unfairness of the disparity.
See 67 MICH. L. REv. 1248, 1250 (1969).
218. Professor Leff suggests that equity cases should not be a guide in analyzing
unconscionability decisions. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperors
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 533 (1967).
219. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2); see Central Budget Corp. v. San-
chez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct. 1967). The circumstances existing
at the formation of the contract are determinative. A disparity does not exist merely
because the value of the property appreciated between the date of the contract and the
date of execution. Drullinger v. Erskine, 71 Cal. App. 2d 492, 163 P.2d 48 (1945);
see Riverside Water Co. v. Jurupa Ditch Co., 187 Cal. App. 2d 538, 9 Cal. Rptr. 742
(1960) (subsequent decrease in value immaterial).
220. If such were true, a mathematical formula could easily be used to determine
unconscionability. Percentage formulations have been used in Civil Law codes. 67
MICH. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (1969). No such formula has been suggested under Urn-
form Commercial Code section 2-302.
able as a matter of law, but in examining the terms of the contract,
its commercial setting, purpose, and effect are to be taken into account.
The disparity must be evaluated in light of the circumstances under
which the contract was consummated and of the relationship between
the parties. If, in light of these factors, the disparity appears to be so
gross as to indicate fraud or imposition, the contract will not be en-
forced.
The following factors are important to a determination that con-
sideration is inadequate: (1) the relationship between the parties;" - '
(2) the absence of a meaningful choice; 222 (3) lack of knowledge
of the nature and terms of the contract, commercial mexperience; 223
(4) the buyer's ability to protect his own interests;221 (5) the sell-
er's knowledge of the buyer's lack of resources to meet obligations
arising under the contract; 225 and (6) the use of other deceptive prac-tices .221,
The leading case finding inadequacy of consideration in a con-
sumer contract is Frostifresh Corp. v Reynoso 227 A couple and
a salesman orally negotiated a contract for the sale of a refrigerator
221. Inequality of bargaining power existing between the parties is often pres-
ent. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
222. In Jones v Star Credit Corp., welfare recipients sought to have a contract
for the sale of a freezer rescinded because of unconscionability. They purchased the
freezer for $1439.69 (including credit charges and sales tax). The retail value of the
freezer was $300. The court held the contract unconscionable as a matter of law.
The seller was aware of the limited financial resources of the purchaser. That
plus the disparity in price "leads inevitably to the felt conclusion that knowing advan-
tage was taken of the plaintiffs." 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup.
Ct. 1969); accord, Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d Ill, 9 UCC
REP SERV. 27 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). But see Morrs v. Capitol Furniture & Appli-
ance Co., 9 UCC REP SERV. 577 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (court rejected argument
that a 100 percent markup was unconscionable), aff'g 8 UCC REP SERv. 321 (D.C.
Ct. Gen. Sess. 1970) (price of $612.70 not unconscionable when cost of product was
$234.45 and no evidence that consumer lacked power to shop around).
223. See American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d
886 (1964) (consumer signed note in blank); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.
2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd for new trial to redetermine damages,
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967) (Spanish-speaking consumers
signed contract in English).
224. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist.
Ct. 1966).
225. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
226. See American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964) (alternative holding); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d
701 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App.
Div. 1970); State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
227 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd for new trial to
redetermine damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
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freezer. Although the conversation was entirely in Spanish, the couple
was presented a contract printed in English which was neither trans-
lated nor explained to them. Before the contract was signed, the hus-
band told the seller than he had only been working for one week and
could not afford the appliance. The salesman, however, "distracted
and deluded the defendants by advising them that the appliance would
cost them nothing because they would be paid bonuses or commissions
of $25 each on the numerous sales that would be made to their neigh-
bors and friends. '228  The appliance was to cost them $1145.88,
comprised of $900 cash sales price plus a $245.88 credit charge.
The seller admitted the cost of the freezer was $348.229 The court
refused to enforce the contract against the couple because the seller
had attempted to gain "too hard a bargain. '2 0  The fact that the
service charge almost equals the cost of the appliance is "indicative
of the oppression which was practiced on these defendants."' 231  This
inadequacy, combined with the buyers' lack of knowledge of both the
commercial situation and the nature and terms of the contract ren-
dered the contract unconscionable.
While the disparity between price and value may be so great as
to warrant a finding of unconscionability per se,232 lesser inadequacies
may be some indication that an inequality of bargaining power has
allowed the seller to take some unfair advantage.233 The disparity
228. 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
229. Various figures have been used for the comparison: the cost of goods for the
seller, Morrs v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 9 UCC REP. SERv. 577 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1971); State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966); the reasonable retail or market value, Kugler v. Romam, 58 N.J. 522,
279 A.2d 640 (1971); Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (Dist.
Ct. 1970); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1969); "value" without specification of the derivation, American Home Improvement,
Inc. v. Maelver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (alternative holding); Toker v.
Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), affd on other grounds, 108
N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970). After a comparison of the con-
sumer's price and the seller's cost plus expenses incurred in selling, a reasonable
finance charge and a reasonable profit should be allowed. In Frostifresh, since the
buyers kept the refrigerator, the trial court awarded the sellers a judgment for only
$348 or the cost of the refrigerator to the seller plus interest. On appeal, the court
opined that the plaintiff was entitled to the "net cost [of] the refrigerator-freezer, plus a
reasonable profit, in addition to trucking and service charges " 54 Misc. 2d at 120,
281 N.Y.S.2d at 965 (App. T. 1967). For a further discussion on analyzing the
price and profit derived by a seller in possibly unconscionable situations, see 67 MIcH.
L. Rnv. 1248 (1969).
230. 52 Misc. 2d at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
231. Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
232. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
233. See State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
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itself may be an indication that unfair advantage was taken over the
buyer, particularly when there is a gross inequality of bargaining
power.234 In installment credit contracts, this inequality is particular-
ly evident when the buyer is poor, uneducated or mexpenenced.235
When this is true, the meaningfulness of choice essential to the making
of a contract is negated.236 The requirement of good faith dealing is
more pressing for merchants in transactions with persons with little
experience, income or education.1 7  An exorbitant price is indicative
of a material departure from this standard.2 3
The Fourth Consideration
The Fact that the Practice May Enable Merchants to Take Advan-
tage of the Inability of Consumers Reasonably to Protect Their
Interests by Reason of Physical or Mental Infirmities, Illiteracy or
Inability to Understand the Language of the Agreement, Igno-
rance or Lack of Education or Similar Facts
California has long recognized that mental infirmities may ef-
fectively destroy the capacity of a person to enter into a valid con-
tract.230  Presently, the level of mental infirmity normally required
restricts the use of this remedy by the consumer to situations where
the person is severely disabled or where the merchant has knowingly
taken advantage of a gross deficiency in the mental process of the
consumer. Physical infirmities normally are not an independent
ground for relief. However, physical condition is relevant insofar
as it is evidence that a mental infirmity exists.240
234. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264,
267 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
235. See Kugler v. Romam, 58 N.J. 522, 544, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (1971).
236. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267
(Sup. Ct. 1969). But see Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Morris, 8 UCC REP.
SERv. 321 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1970), af 'd, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 577 (D.C. Ct. App.
1971).
237 Kugler v. Romam, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971). See 67 MICH. L.
RaV. 1248, 1258 (1969). The Uniform Commercial Code requires parties to all code
transactions to exercise good faith defined as honesty m fact for any party, and
honesty in fact plus fair dealing in the trade for merchants in sales of goods transac-
tions. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b).
238. Kugler v. Roman, 58 N.J. 522, 545, 279 A.2d 640, 653 (1971). For a
critical analysis of the standards evolving from the unconscionability decisions, see
Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1969-70), and for
responses to this article, see Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, id.
at 337; Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, ad. at 349; Speidel, Unconsctonability, Assent and Consumer Protection, id.
at 359.
239. See, e.g., Carr v. Sacramento Clay Prods. Co., 35 Cal. App. 439, 170 P 446
(1917).
240. President of Bowdom College v. Merritt, 75 F 480, 487 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
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Total Mental Incapacity
California recognizes three distinct levels of mental incapacity,
each of which can be the basis for rescission of a contract.24 1 The
most severe disability is to be entirely without understanding. Such
a person has "no power to make a contract of any kind, but he is
liable for the reasonable value of things furnished to him necessary
for his support or the support of his family."24  Once a person is
declared incompetent by the courts, that person is incapable of making
a valid contract.2 43  Even if the person later regains competence,
his assent remains ineffective until he has been certified as having
been "restored to reason .... ",244 Alternatively, a person may seek
to rescind a contract by seeking a judicial determination of his in-
competence.2 45
However, a total lack of understanding is not literally required,
for hardly in any case can even the most insane persons be said
to be without some degree of understanding .. rather it is to be
understood as restricted to the subject-matter to which the sec-
tion relates,-which is that of contracts, executed and executory,-
and hence . . . to all persons . . entirely without the capacity
of understanding or comprehending such transactions. 2 6
More than a mental infirmity must be present. Because of the in-
firmity, a person must be unable to comprehend business transactions
in general. Ability to understand contractual rights and obligations in
general, though not those of a particular transaction, is not sufficient.
Such a person is not "entirely without understanding. 24 7
Inability to Comprehend the Nature of a Particular Contract
A person may not be totally incapacitated as required above,
yet he may be suffering from some lesser mental weakness which
effectively destroys his capacity to make a contract.248  The test for
1896), appeal dismissed, 169 U.S. 551 (1898); Markus v. Lester, 59 Cal. App. 564, 566,
211 P 240, 241 (1922).
241. Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 131, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 540 (1966) (describing all three areas as "undue susceptability").
242. CAL. Crv. CODE § 38 (West 1954).
243. Id. § 40 (West Supp. 1973). This incapacity to contract is not because of
his incompetence, but rather because the court decree is "notice to the world of his
incapacity to make a valid contract." Hellman Commercial Trust & Say. Bank v.
Alden, 206 Cal. 592, 604, 275 P. 794, 799 (1929).
244. CAL. Crv. CODE § 40 (West Supp. 1973); see Doran v. Dreyer, 143 Cal.
App. 2d 289, 299 P.2d 661 (1956).
245. See, e.g., Jacks v. Estee, 139 Cal. 507, 73 P. 247 (1903); Markus v. Lester,
59 Cal. App. 564, 211 P. 240 (1922).
246. Jacks v. Estee, 139 Cal. 507, 511, 73 P 247, 248 (1903).
247. See id. at 511, 73 P. at 248.
248. "A conveyance or other contract of a person of unsound mind, but not en-
this lesser weakness is whether the party is mentally competent to
deal with the contract immediately before him with a full under-
standing of his rights.249 Contracts made by such persons are not
void, but are voidable.250
Again, a person must be suffering from some mental mfirmity
Advanced senility 51 and insanity252 are the most common infirmities
recognized, but severe emotional trauma caused by sickness or worry
will suffice.253  The existence of an infirmity is not a sufficient reason
to rescind a contract. It must further be shown that the infirmity
rendered the person incapable of understanding the "nature, purpose
and effect" 254 of the contract before him. A person may be able to
recognize that the paper before him is a contract without fully realiz-
ing the effect it will have on him.2"5
For example, in an action to set aside a conveyance of the plain-
tiff's ranch property, the plaintiff's guardian alleged that the plaintiff
was incompetent at the time of the conveyance. Plaintiff, aged eighty-
six, had had his hair singed off and had received a blow on the head in
tirely without understanding, made before his incapacity has been judicially deter-
mined, is subject to rescission " CAL. CIV CODE § 39 (West 1954). See
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 131, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533,
540 (1966); Drum v. Bummer, 77 Cal. App. 2d 453, 175 P.2d 879 (1946).
249. Stratton v. Grant, 139 Cal. App. 2d 814, 817, 294 P.2d 500, 501 (1956).
250. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 39 (West 1954). However, such a contract cannot be
rescinded unless the party seeking rescission restores or offers to restore all considera-
tion received. Mills v. Kopf, 216 Cal. App. 2d 780, 783, 31 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1963).
251. E.g., Stratton v. Grant, 139 Cal. App. 2d 814, 294 P.2d 500 (1956).
252. Mills v. Kopf, 216 Cal. App. 2d 780, 31 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1963) (agitated
depression to a psychotic degree); Peterson v. Ellebrecht, 205 Cal. App. 2d 718, 23
Cal. Rptr. 349 (1962) (borderline mental defective unable to deal with abstractions
such as the concept of title); Philbrook v. Howard, 157 Cal. App. 2d 210, 320 P.2d
609 (1958).
253. Carr v. Sacramento Clay Prods. Co., 35 Cal. App. 439, 170 P 446 (1917).
Alternatively, rescission has been allowed under similar circumstances because of undue
influence. See Wetzstein v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 554, 93 P.2d 1028 (1939).
Intoxication which deprives a person of reason and understanding also is equivalent
to a lack of mental capacity by reason of insanity. See, e.g., Guidici v. Guidici, 2
Cal. 2d 497, 41 P.2d 932 (1935); Walton v. Bank of California, 218 Cal. App. 2d
527, 32 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1963).
254. Drum v. Bummer, 77 Cal. App. 2d 453, 460, 175 P.2d 879, 883 (1946).
If some infirmity is present, but the person is fully capable of understanding the na-
ture and effect of a contract, then it will be enforced. Senile persons are still pre-
sumed to be able to understand the nature of contracts they sign. Holman v. Stockton
Say. & Loan Bank, 49 Cal. App. 2d 500, 508, 122 P.2d 120, 124 (1942).
255. This ability must be evaluated m light of the complexity presented in the
contract. It is recognized that some contracts "may be so complex and intricate as to
require a keener discernment of intellect and understanding than would be required to
execute an ordinary, simple will." Pomeroy v. Collins, 198 Cal. 46, 68 ,243 P 657,
666 (1926).
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a fire which caused his mental condition to deteriorate. 256  He then
offered to sell his property to the defendant at terms they had dis-
cussed six years earlier, although the land was now worth more than
twice as much. Shortly after the conveyance, he went berserk and
was confined to a state mental hospital. The diagnosis was that he
was suffering from a chronic brain syndrome associated with senile
brain disease, with psychotic reaction. Further tests showed that the
condition had evidently been progressing for years. There was also
evidence that at the time of the conveyance he was unable to recog-
nize his friends, that he had made false accusations, had complained
of headaches, was suffering from hallucinations and delusions and had
become lost. Because of this evidence, the plaintiff was declared
incompetent at the time of the conveyance and the contract was re-
scinded.25'
Both of these types of mental incompetence require an examina-
tion of the individual's cognitive capacity to consent.255 The first
requires a lack of understanding of the nature and effect of con-
tractual obligations in general. The second, lesser form of mental
weakness requires only that the person be without understanding of
the nature, purpose and effect of the contract presently before him.
He may well understand commercial transactions in general. The con-
tract before him, however, is outside his mental grasp. The ability
of the person to understand must be analyzed relative to the nature
and degree of complexity of the contractY.2 9  There need be no evi-
dence that the dominant party knowingly took advantage of the weaker
party's inability to understand the nature of the bargain. As -long
as the cognitive capacity of the infirm party falls below the standards
for mental competency, that person will be entitled to rescission of
the contract.26 °
Undue Influence
A still lesser weakness of mind may be grounds for rescission
under the doctrine of undue influence. California Civil Code section
1575(2) defines undue influence as "taking an unfair advantage of
another's weakness of mind . ... "261 While it is clear that the
256. Philbrook v. Howard, 157 Cal. App. 2d 210, 320 P.2d 609 (1958).
257. Id.
258. Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 832, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521, 527 (1968).
See Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Contract or Convey, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 211,
216 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Weihofen].
259. Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 832, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521, 527 (1968);
see Weihofen, supra note 258, at 217-18.
260. No conscious overreaching need be present. Stratton v. Grant, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 814, 818, 294 P.2d 500, 502 (1956).
261. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1575(2) (West 1954).
standards of incompetence described above could be included in this
definition, this doctrine is usually utilized in cases where lesser weak-
nesses are present.
This particular brand of undue susceptibility need not be long-
lasting nor wholly incapacitating, but may be merely a lack of full
vigor due to age, physical condition, emotional anguish, or a com-
bination of such factors [T]his lesser weakness could per-
haps be called weakness of spirit. But whatever name we give it,
this first element resolves itself into a lessened capacity of the
object to make a free contract. 262
In Odorizzi, the required lessened capacity was indicated by the ex-
haustion and emotional turmoil surrounding the arrest and detention
of the teacher on criminal homosexual charges.263
Since the requirement of mental weakness under section 1575
(2) is for a lesser weakness than that required under the discussion
of total incompetence above, a mental illness not affecting the under-
standing may still render consent invalid. For example, a manic-
depressive psychosis is said to impair the judgment, but not the under-
standing, of the affected person. 64 Since his understanding remains
intact, he is not incompetent to contract. However, such a per-
son may be motivated "to enter into ill-advised contracts and thus
bring contractual competence into question. ' 265  Such a weakness of
mind is clearly within the scope of 1575 (2) 266
262. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 131, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 540 (1966); accord, Keithley v. Civil Serv. Bd., 11 Cal. App. 3d 443, 89
Cal. Rptr. 809 (1970). While the doctrine of undue influence is normally used by
persons of undue weakness, undue influence actually involves an imbalance between a
dominant subject and one who is servient. However, it is doubtful that a normal
person whose faculties are not in some way impaired through mental disability or emo-
tional stress would have any remedy under the doctrine of undue influence. See
Estate of Anderson, 185 Cal. 700, 707-08, 198 P 407, 410 (1921).
263. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr.
533 (1966).
264. Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 832-33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521, 527
(1968).
265. Id. at 833, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 527
266. Other inequitable circumstances are often present m many of the cases grant-
ing recovery under undue influence. Even though the mental infirmity may not be
serious enough to require rescission, the existence of other factors, such as inadequate
consideration or coercion, may strengthen the action. For example, age and infirm
health, though not totally incapacitating, may render one less able to resist coercion
exerted by the stronger party. See Stewart v. Marvin, 139 Cal. App. 2d 769, 775,
294 P.2d 114, 119 (1956); Shaffer v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 4 Cal. App. 2d 707,
712, 41 P.2d 948, 950 (1935). The additional factor of inadequate consideration may
often be present. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 476, 71 P.2d 220,
253 (1937); Peterson v. Ellebrecht, 205 Cal. App. 2d 718, 720, 23 Cal. Rptr. 349,
350 (1962). The advantage may be gained through the use of fraudulent repre-
sentations which the weakened party is unable to resist. See, e.g., Estate of Ricks,
160 Cal. 467, 481-82, 117 P 539, 545 (1911).
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Although many of the reported cases involve persons who are
aged, sick or senile, these conditions alone do not establish inca-
pacity.20 7 A person of advanced years, for example, has the normal
capacity to contract. Sufficient evidence must be advanced to estab-
lish that a person's mind has been weakened to the extent that he
now has an impaired mental capacity.268 The age of that person may
be of importance, however. 269  Although a person of advanced years
may be capable of understanding the nature and effect of a contract,
he may be lacking of sufficient vigor to resist constant harassment.
7 0
In order to gain rescission of a contract for undue influence of
this type, there must have been some unfair advantage taken of the
servient person. 71 Knowledge of the weakness and an intent to gain
advantage over the weakened party must be shown. 2  The spectre
of overpersuasion, the hard sell, is again present.2 78 "The hallmark
of such persuasion is high pressure, a pressure which works on mental,
moral, or emotional weakness to such an extent that it approaches
the boundaries of coercion.12 74  The actions of the dominant party
must effectively overcome the will of the servient party without con-
vincing his judgment. 5  For example, in Weger v. Rocha,270 the
court rescinded a release signed by a woman who was still in the
hospital recovering from her injury. She was visited by an agent of
the insurance company while she was in a cast, flat on her back and
in pain. After a two-hour interview, the woman signed the release
in order to terminate the interview. While her infirmities were
largely physical, she was found to be in a nervous and hysterical
condition. The court found undue influence.Y
77
267. See Kelly v. McCarthy, 6 Cal. 2d 347, 57 P.2d 118 (1936); Holman v.
Stockton Say. & Loan Bank, 49 Cal. App. 2d 500, 122 P.2d 120 (1942).
268. See Kelly v. McCarthy, 6 Cal. 2d 347, 57 P.2d 118 (1936).
269. See Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 131, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 540 (1966).
270. See, e.g., Stenger v. Anderson, 66 Cal. 2d 970, 429 P.2d 164, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 844 (1967).
271. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1575, 1689 (West 1954).
272. See Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968);
Deasy v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 235, 238, 178 P 538, 539 (1918) (knowledge of in-
firmity may raise question of constructive fraud).
273. See text accompanying notes 184-86 supra.
274. Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 539 (1966).
275. Id.
276. 138 Cal. App. 109, 32 P.2d 417 (1934).
277. Id. at 114-15, 32 P.2d at 420. See also Moore v. Moore, 81 Cal. 195,
22 P. 589 (1889); Wetzstem v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 554, 93 P.2d 1028
(1939). Financial distress at the time of consent is an important element in many
instances of undue influence. E.g., Weesner v. Leased Transp., 95 Cal. App. 2d 414,
424, 213 P.2d 26, 32 (1949).
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When no advantage has been taken of the mental infirmities of
the servient party, or when there is no evidence that the dominant
party was aware of the weakness of mind, no coercion and thus no
undue influence will be found.278 Under many circumstances, an
undue susceptibility will be obvious to the other party Indeed, most
of the cases involve transactions between persons with full knowledge
of another's weaknesses or predicament. However, in the normal
consumer transaction, such familiarity is not present. The average
merchant does not transact business with any knowledge of the cus-
tomer's weaknesses other than that conveyed by the customer's ap-
pearance and manner. However, when the merchant is aware of the
infirmity of his customer and tries to take unreasonable advantage of
the customer, the doctrine of undue influence will allow the customer
to rescind the contract.
Illiteracy, Ignorance, or Other Factors
Traditionally, the person who is unable to read a contract be-
cause of illiteracy or inability to read English has been in the same
position as one who fails to read a contract.279 If a reasonable man
would seek another's aid in explaining the contractual rights and
duties contained in the instrument under consideration, then an il-
literate person would be negligent in not so doing. His illiteracy alone
does not affect the validity of the contract. 28 0  General ignorance and
lack of education have the same effect. 28 '
278. See Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 836, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521, 529
(1968).
279. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 558, 560 (1875); cf. C.I.T. Corp. v. Panac,
25 Cal. 2d 547, 560, 154 P.2d 710, 718 (1944).
280. In fact, it would seem that an illiterate person would automatically be put on
notice that he must seek reliable help in learning the nature of the contract. Such a
person may need to place a great deal of reliance on the aid of others. To the extent
his inability to protect his own interests becomes greater, he becomes increasingly at
the mercy of unscrupulous sellers. His ignorance or lack of education may therefore
affect the issue of the reasonableness of his reliance on the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions of others. See C.I.T. Corp. v. Panac, 25 Cal. 2d 547, 154 P.2d 710 (1944);
Cortez v. Weymouth, 235 Cal. App. 2d 140, 45 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1965); Gardner v.
Rubin, 149 Cal. App. 2d 368, 308 P.2d 892 (1957). Furthermore, the illiterate
person stands in a position no different from that of a normal man unable to compre-
hend the effect of a complex agreement.
281. "Illiteracy is largely a matter of degree and must be considered in the light
of the subject matter to be read or understood." C.I.T. Corp. v. Panac, 25 Cal. 2d 547,
558, 154 P.2d 710, 717 (1944).
An early case granted recovery to a bank depositor who was unable to read a limi-
tation on a stop payment order he signed. However, the illiteracy was not the decisive
factor. Such a limitation was held to be against public policy. Hiroshima v. Bank of
Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 372-74, 248 P 947, 951-52 (1926); accord, Grisinger v.
Golden State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 P 425 (1928). Illiteracy in combination
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Increasingly, however, these factors are taking on an important
role in contract formation. For this reason, persons unable to read
or understand the terms of contracts because of these factors must
be distinguished from others who merely fail to read a contract.
2 82
Lack of education, ignorance, inability to understand a contract be-
cause of illiteracy or language barriers all indicate an inequality of
bargaining position. 283
Persons with limitations such as these are often the easy prey
of unscrupulous merchants. This has become increasingly true as the
use and availability of consumer credit has become widespread, and
as the possession of consumer goods has become a symbol of suc-
cess. 284  The lack of equality of bargaining power evidenced by an
inability to comprehend the terms of a contract is of great weight in
determining the unconscionability of a consumer contract.28
For example, in Jefferson Credit Co. v. Marcano,26 the as-
signee of an installment credit contract for an automobile brought
an action to recover the unpaid balance. The defendant had only a
sketchy knowledge of the English language, and did not understand
the contractual clauses which "waived both the warranty of mer-
chantability and the warranty of fitness for the purpose for which
the motor vehicle was purchased . 2.. His defense was that
the automobile was in a defective condition and that the waiver should
be found unconscionable. The New York court utilized section 2-302
to find the contract unconscionable because of the lack of equality
between the bargaining parties, the defendants, unknowing and un-
witting waiver of the warranties and the defective condition of the
automobile.2 8
with other inequitable factors may be sufficient for relief. See Estate of Ginsberg,
11 Cal. App. 2d 210, 53 P.2d 397 (1936).
282. Failure to read the terms of a contract is still not a sufficient basis for
rescission. Fedenco V. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 875, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74, 75 (1970).
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
283. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Kugler v. Romam, 58 NJ. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Jefferson Credit Corp.
v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (consumer had only a
sketchy knowledge of English); Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d
757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd to redetermine damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d
964 (App. T. 1967) (contract m English even though sales transaction entirely m
Spanish).
284. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Civ. Ct. 1969); Murphy, supra note 99, at 303, Project; The Direct Selling Indus-
try: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 883, 918-19 (1969).
285. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Civ. Ct. 1969).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 142, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
288. Id. at 142, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Fifth Consideration
The Degree to which Terms of the Transaction Require Con-
sumers to Waive Legal Rights
Because of the consumer's lack of bargaining power, transactions
in which he waives a legal right raise questions of his knowledge of
those rights, of his knowing consent to the waiver, and of his free
choice to enter such a contract. When such a waiver has occurred,
the consumer has a number of common law remedies, regardless of
his lack of bargaining power. Further, he may use the adhesion
contract doctrine to protect himself where he lacked knowledge of
the existence of a provision in a standardized contract. Increasingly,
the California consumer may rely on statutory protections against his
bargaining away legal rights. The last group of protections are ef-
fective as long as the consumer is within the statutory class, regard-
less of his bargaining power or knowledge of the waiver. Jurisdic-
tions operating under section 2-302 have used the doctrine of un-
conscionability to allow the consumer to avoid the effect of a waiver
of some legal right. However, as will be seen, many of the factual
situations would be decided on another statutory basis in California.
Waiver of Jurisdiction of a Court for Future Actions
Attempts by sellers to enforce contracts in distant forums may
result in great hardships to most consumers. In a number of cases
involving Paragon Homes, Inc.,2 9 a New York court refused to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident consumers. The defendants, residents
of Massachusetts,29 ° signed a contract with a Massachusetts corpora-
tion. The contract contained a clause providing that "[t]his agree-
ment shall be deemed to have been made in Nassau County, New
York, and the parties . hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, Nassau County, New York, for the purpose of ad-
judication of all their respective rights and liabilities hereunder."29'
The court emphasized that the contract was executed and breached in
Massachusetts, and that New York was "unsuitable to the accommoda-
tions of the parties and the subject of the litigation 2912 Fur-
ther, the parties were not contracting on an equal basis, as evi-
denced by the commercial nature of the plaintiff's activities on the one
hand and the purchase of goods for nonbusmess use on the other.
289. Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Langlois, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967); Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Crace, 4 UCC REP SERV. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967);
Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 4 UCC REP SERv 1144 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd
mem., 5 UCC REP SERv. 991 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
290. Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Langlois, 4 UCC REP. Smwv. 16 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1967).
291. Id. at 17-18.
292. Id. at 18.
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The use of such a provision in a printed form contract was "for the
purpose of harassing and embarrassing the defendants in the prosecu-
tion or defense of any action arsmg thereunder."2 93 The court deemed
it "grossly unfair and unconscionable."2 94
California courts have long provided that parties may not divest
a court of its jurisdiction over future causes of action through private
contract.295  Contracts which stipulate that the courts of State
X or County Y shall be used to settle any future disputes arsmg
under the contract are of no effect in gaining dismissal of a suit on
the contract brought in another, but appropriate, jurisdiction.296  Such
clauses are thought to be against public policy on the ground that
contracts should not be used to "oust courts other than those speci-
fied of the jurisdiction which would otherwise be theirs."29 7
There is a growing body of authority outside California advo-
cating that such stipulations should be enforceable as long as the
choice of forum is reasonable.298  However, even this trend toward
greater liberality in allowing parties to choose a forum voluntarily in
advance of litigation recognizes that if no equality of bargaining
power is present, adhesion contract doctrine requires that such clauses
be stricken.299
California Civil Code section 1804.1 (the Unruh Act)30 0 pro-
vides additional protection for the consumer in a retail installment
sale. No such contract may authorize the seller to bring suit in any
county other than "the county in which the contract was in fact
signed by the buyer, the county in which the buyer resides at the
commencement of the action, the county in which the buyer resided
at the time that the contract was entered into, or in the county in
which the goods purchased pursuant to such contract have been so
293. Id. at 19.
294. Id. A clause waiving the right to a jury trial was held to be unconscionable
by the trial court m David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1090,
287 N.Y.S.2d 503, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 1145 (Civ. Ct. 1968), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 248,
298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. T. 1969).
295. Beirut Umversal Bank, S.A.L. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 832,
74 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1969).
296. Id., Duque v. Duque, 155 Cal. App. 2d 142, 317 P.2d 63 (1957); Mannix
v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 740, 24 P.2d 507 (1933); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Codiga, 62 Cal. App. 117, 216 P 383 (1923). But see Jack Winter, Inc. v.
Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (enforcing forum agreement in a
contract).
297. Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300, 304 (1957).
298. See Bergman, Contractual Restinctions on the Forum, 48 C..L. L. REv.
438 (1960); 17 SrAT. L. REv. 299 (1965).
299. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 38 F.R.D. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1965);
17 SrAN. L. REv. 299, 307 (1965).
300. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1804.1 (West 1973).
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affixed to real property as to become a part of such real property "301
Confessions of Judgment
Cognovit notes that permit the appearance of an attorney for the
purpose of waiver of service of process and confession of judgment
are specifically authorized by statute m California. 30 2  The use of
such instruments, however, has not been favored by California
courts. 303 Strict compliance with the procedural aspects of the auth-
orizing statutes is required.0 4 For example, in Barnes v Hilton, °5
a judgment debtor moved to vacate a judgment entered after default
on a note. The debtor had executed promissory notes containing an
authorization for any attorney of any court of record to enter an ap-
pearance and confess judgment. Later, an attorney confessed judg-
ment and submitted a "verified statement of facts. 306  The court set
aside the judgment on the ground that the statute required that the
statement be signed and verified by the debtor. The statute, in effect,
prevents the use of a clause which allows any attorney to prepare and
verify the statement of facts out of which the action arose and to
confess judgment.30 7
Further limitations are placed on cognovit judgments when used
in specific classes of contracts. Clauses which confess judgment
301. Id. § 1804.1(i) (West 1973); id. § 2983.7(f) (West Supp. 1973) (condi-
tional sales contracts of automobiles). See generally id. 88 1801.1, 1812.10 (West
1973). Provisions in contracts stipulating choice of law that will be applied m case of
dispute are generally upheld. Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp.,
227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
302. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. 88 1132-34 (West 1972). "A statement in writing
must be made, signed by the defendant, and verified by his oath, to the following
effect:
1) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum;
2) If it be for money due, or to become due, it must state concisely the facts out of
which it arose, and show that the sum confessed therefor is justly due, or to become
due " Id. § 1133.
303. See Barnes v. Hilton, 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953); Hopson,
Cognovit Judgements: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit,
29 U. Cii. L. REV. 111, 131-32 (1961).
304. See Mechanics Bank v. Thole, 20 Cal. App. 3d 884, 98 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1971).
305. 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953).
306. Id., see CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1133(2) (West 1955). "The object of the
statute in requirng this statement is to put the creditors on the track of inquiry, and to
enable them to discover the fraud, if any; and to discourage perjury by requiring a defi-
nite and particular account of the transaction " Cordier v. Schloss, 18 Cal. 576,
581 (1861).
307 118 Cal. App. 2d at 110, 257 P.2d at 99. But when it is clear that the de-
fendant's rights are not being prejudiced by the entry of judgment by confession,
Barnes will not be followed. Los Angeles Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Noonan, 181
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 834, 5 Cal. Rptr. 445 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1960).
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may be void if included in retail installment sales contracts, 08 condi-
tional sales contracts for automobiles3 9 and loan agreements for less
than $1000.310 While these statutory provisions protect the consumer
in most of the transactions he normally enters, further protection for
the consumer may be available through the adhesion contract doc-
trine. While no California case has voided a cognovit clause con-
tained in an adhesion contract, the potential for overreaching by a
superior bargaining power is evident in the use of such a clause.
11
While two recent United States Supreme Court rulings upheld the
use of cognovit notes against challenges to their constitutionality on
due process grounds, both decisions emphasized that if the contracts
had been adhesive, a different result might have been reached. 12
Waivers of Defenses
The assignment of consumer paper following a transaction be-
tween a consumer and a merchant has become a prevalent part of
consumer credit schemes. In order to facilitate this arrangement and
in order to protect the assignee, the installment contract may contain
a clause waiving defenses against an assignee. 313 The result of such
a clause is that the consumer will be forced to continue payment
even though the seller has defaulted.
308. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1804.1(c) (West 1973).
309. id. § 2983.7(b) (West Supp. 1973).
310. CAL. Frt. CoDE § 24468 (West 1968). See also id. § 22467 (loans less
than $5000 given by personal property broker); id. § 18673 (loans made by mdus-
trial loan company).
311. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F Supp. 1091 (1970), affd on other grounds, 405
U.S. 191 (1972).
312. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 201 (1972); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972); see, Note, The Demise of Summary Prejudgment
Remedies in California, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 489 (1972). In Blair v Pitchess, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that constitutional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures could not be waived by consent obtained by a contract of ad-
hesion. Thus, clauses contained in a contract of adhesion which permit the seller to
enter the buyer's premises and repossess the chattel upon default would not be valid.
5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
313. The problem may anse in two respects. First, the buyer may sign a nego-
tiable instrument which the seller negotiates to a holder m due course or one assert-
ing that status. Second, the buyer may sign a contract containing a waiver of defense
clause. In either case, the buyer may be precluded from asserting certain defenses
against the assignee. See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
68 CoLTum. L. REv. 387, 433-38 (1968); Knpke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, 469-73 (1968); Murphy,
Another "Assault upon the Citadel"" Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and
Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OiHo ST. L.J. 667 (1968); Note,
Consumer Financing, Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 611 (1970).
For example, the facts of Unico v Owens'4 are typical of the
position of the consumer vis-ii-vis a defaulting seller. The couple
thought they were purchasing 140 stereo albums to be sent in
installments over five years and that they would receive a stereo
record player without separate charge from Universal Stereo Corpora-
tion. In return, they were to make a down payment and thirty-six
monthly installments. Universal immediately assigned the contract to
Unico. Universal sent the record player and twelve albums and then
became insolvent and made no further deliveries. When the con-
sumer ceased payments, Umco brought suit to recover the balance
due on the note. When the consumer pleaded the defense of fail-
ure of consideration, Unico asserted its freedom from the defense be-
cause of its status as a holder in due course and also invoked a
clause from the installment contract which stated:
Buyer hereby acknowledges notice that this contract may be as-
signed and agrees that the liability of the Buyer to any as-
signee shall be unmediate and absolute and not affected by any
default whatsoever of the Seller Buyer further agrees not
to set up any claim against such Seller as a defense, counter-
claim or offset to any action by any assignee for the unpaid bal-
ance of the purchase price 315
The California approach to the waiver of defense clauses31 be-
gins with an examination of California Commercial Code section
9206 which provides in part:
(1) Subject to any statute which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer
or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or
defense which he many have against the seller or lessor is en-
forceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to de-
fenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under the division on commercial
paper (Division 3).31"
The provisions of the Unruh Act,3 " pertaining to retail install-
ment sales, and the Automobile Sales Finance Act31 establish a differ-
ent rule for buyers of consumer goods in the most common types of
transaction. 20 The Unruh Act provides:
No contract or obligation shall contain any provision by which
[tihe buyer agrees not to assert against a seller a claim or
314. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
315. Id. at 123, 232 A.2d at 417
316. See Note, Judicial Protection for the Consumer: Vasquez v. Superior Court,
23 HASTNGs L.J. 513 (1972).
317 CAL. CoMM. CODE § 9206 (West 1964).
318. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1801 et seq. (West 1973).
319. Id. § 2981 et seq. (West Supp. 1973).
320. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 823, 484 P.2d 964, 979, 94
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defense arising out of the sale or agrees not to assert against an
assignee such a claim or defense other than as provided in [Civil
Code] Section 1804.2.321
Section 1804.2 provides:
An assignee of the seller's rights is subject to all equities and de-
fenses of the buyer against the seller arising out of the sale and
existing in favor of the buyer at the time of the assignment, notwith-
standing an agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's liability
may not exceed the amount of the debt owing to the assignee at
the time that notice of equities and defenses is given to the as-
signee. 322
The Automobile Sales Finance Act contains provisions of simi-
lar import.32 3  The effect of these acts is to protect the consumer
against contracts containing clauses waiving certain defenses against
an assignee. Such a clause in an installment sales contract covered by
the Unruh Act would be unenforceable.32 4
However, there are situations affecting consumers not covered
by the provisions of either of these acts. For example, contracts for
construction or sale of residential or commercial property are exempt-
ed. Section 1802.2 exempts certain services from the coverage
of the act. 28  Further, the language of section 1804.2 does not apply
to the fact situation presented in the Unico case. The seller in Unico
was in default only when the second installment was not received.
By this time the note was already assigned to Unico. Thus, the
consumer's defense of failure of consideration did not exist in favor
of the buyer at the time of the assignment.32 7
Cal. Rptr. 796, 811 (1971).
321. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1804.1 (West 1973).
322. Id. § 1804.2 (West 1973). Id. § 1812.7 provides: "In case of failure by
any person to comply with the provisions of this chapter, such person or any person
who acquires a contract or installment account with knowledge of such noncompliance
is barred from recovery of any finance charge . .. imposed in connection with such
contract or installment account and the buyer shall have the right to recover from such
person an amount equal to any of such charges paid by the buyer (emphasis added).
323. Id. § 2983.5, 2983.7 (West Supp. 1973).
324. Id. § 1804.4 (West 1973).
325. Id. § 1801.4 (West 1973). This statute was enacted as a reaction to Mor-
gan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968). Cal.
Stat. 1969, ch. 554, § 2, at 1180.
326. "'Services' means work, labor and services, for other than a commercial or
business use . . but does not include the services of physicians or dentists, nor
services for which the tariffs, rates, charges, costs or expenses, including in each in-
stance the deferred payment price, are required by law to be filed with and approved
by the federal government . " CAL. CIV. CODE § 1802.2 (West 1973).
327. The most common defenses that consumers attempt to raise against an
assignee are fraud in the execution of the instrument, fraud in the inducement, failure
of consideration and unsatisfactory performance by the seller. Littlefield, Good Faith
As a result, the consumer must prove that the assignee did not
take the assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of
a claim or defense, and therefore was not a holder m due course.
328
California has long denied status as holder in due course to a finan-
cier because of his "close connection" to the seller. For example, in
Commercial Credit Corp. v Orange County Machine Works,3 29 the
court denied due course status to a finance company that advanced
money to the seller with the understanding that the instruments de-
rived from the sale would be immediately assigned to it. In addition,
it supplied the forms to the seller and actively participated in the
transaction from its inception. The finance company was so closely
connected to the transaction that it was "a moving force in the
transaction from its very inception and acted as a party to it."33
Holder m due course status was therefore denied.
Purrchaser of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV
48, 62-63 (1966).
328. A holder in due course is defined by California Commercial Code section
3302 (West 1964) as:
"[A] holder who takes the instrument
(a) For value; and
(b) In good faith; and
(c) Without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against
or claim to it on the part of any person."
For a fuller discussion of the good faith test as it has been used in consumer cases,
see Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Sub-
jective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1966) and the articles cited note 313 supra.
The rights of a holder in due course are provided in California Commercial Code
section 3305 (West 1964). A holder in due course takes the instrument free from
"(2) All defense of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt
except
(a) Infancy ., and
(b) Such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the
obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) Such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or
its essential terms; and
(d) Discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) Any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the instru-
ment." Id.
A comment to Uniform Commercial Code section 3-305 provides that "[i]n
determining what is a reasonable opportunity [under (c) above] all relevant
factors are to be taken into account, including the age and sex of the party, his in-
telligence, education and business experience; his ability to read or to understand
English, the representations made to him and his reason to rely on them or to have
confidence in the person making them; the presence or absence of any third person
who might read or explain the instrument to him, or any other possibility of obtaining
independent information; and the apparent necessity, or lack of it, for acting without
delay." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305, Comment 7
329 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
330. Id. at 771, 214 P.2d at 822; accord, Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d
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Commerical Credit focused on the actual knowledge of the prac-
tices used by the seller as an indication that the financier was so
involved that he should be demed due course status. In Morgan v.
Reasor Corp.,ss1 this standard of knowledge was greatly revised so
that if a "holder possesses knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reas-
onable man on inquiry, '3 32 his protected status will not insulate him
from defenses arising out of violations of the Unruh Act.33 In so
doing the court recognized that a liberal interpretation of the knowl-
edge requirement may aid in forcing sellers to comply with the
provisions of the Unruh Act and may motivate financiers to police
the consumer credit market more effectively.33
In Unico, the New Jersey court found that there was such a
881, 894, 447 P.2d 638, 646-47, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 406-07 (1968). The supreme
court evidently rejected the contention that Morgan was overruled by the enactment of
California Civil Code Section 1801.4 in 1969. See note 325 supra. This section only
withdraws certain contracts for construction and/or sale of a residence or commercial
building from the purview of the Unruh Act. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.
3d 800, 822, 484 P.2d 964, 978, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 810 (1971); 58 CALIF. L. REv.
80, 213-14 (1970).
331. 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968). In Morgan, the
buyers of a house to be constructed on their land sought a judgment to prevent the
assignee of the seller from obtaining carrying charges because of violations of the Un-
ruh Act.
332. Id. at 893, 447 P.2d at 646, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
333. The court, by way of dictum in Morgan, held that the rule of "close connec-
tion" may be invoked if the buyer shows that "the seller contemplated that the credit
would in fact be advanced by, and the note in fact held by, the particular financing
institution involved, since such proof would amount to a demonstration of ratification
of an undisclosed agency." Id. at 895, 447 P.2d at 647-48, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08
(dictum).
334. "The important function of section 1812.7 becomes particularly apparent in
the case of a seller inclined frequently to violate the act. We recognize that stringent
enforcement of section 1812.7 will tend to .ompel such a retailer to sell his paper at a
greater discount and to charge a proportionately higher price for his goods. In all
likelihood, this increase in retail prices will deter customers from dealing with such a
seller. Moreover, such enforcement will effectuate a proper allocation of possible fi-
nancial loss. The impact of the violations will be borne, not by a few consumers
unable to pass on the loss or in any way 'insure' against the effect of a harsh contract,
but by finance companies that buy large numbers of notes. Such financiers are
obviously better able than buyers to absorb the loss of an occasional bad deal. Finally,
strict enforcement will give finance companies, with the knowledge and economic
leverage required effectively to police against Unruh Act violations, an incentive to do
so." Id. at 890, 447 P.2d at 644, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The result of an increased
burden may create problems for finance companies. The less stringent knowledge re-
quirements may force finance companies to become involved in the activities of the
commercial activities from whom it normally buys commercial paper m order to pro-
tect itself under the Morgan decision. As the finance company becomes more in-
volved, the spectre of a "close connection" looms larger, thus possibly forfeiting the
protections afforded a holder in due course. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.
3d 800, 824-25, 484 P.2d 964, 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 812 (1971).
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close connection between Unico and Universal that Unico could not
be considered a holder in due course. Umco was created expressly
to purchase the commercial paper generated by Universal's sales,
and took an active role in the affairs of Universal. It had the power
to place a representative on Universal's premises, to inspect its rec-
ords at any time, and to set standards for the transactions between
Universal and any customer. It also agreed to take a substantial part
of the commercial paper generated by Universal.335 In short, "Umco
not only had a thorough knowledge of the nature and method of
operation of Universal's business, but also exercised extensive control
over it."3
36
The court in Urnco went on to express a reluctance to enforce
the waiver of defense clause because of the unconscionable nature of
the transaction. The court recognized that
there is almost always a substantial differential in bargaining
power between the seller and his financier, on the one side, and
the householder on the other because generally there is a
substantial inequality of economic resources between them, and of
course, that balance in the great mass of cases favors the seller
and gives him and his financier the power to shape the exchange
to their advantage.33'
Contracts made under such circumstances are generally "so fraught
with opportunities for misuse that purchasers must be protected
against oppressive and unconscionable clauses." 38 Sections 9-206
and 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code when read together
evidence
an intention to leave in the hands of the courts the continued
application of common law principles in deciding in consumer goods
335. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 114-15, 232 A.2d 405, 412-13 (1967).
336. Id. at 115, 232 A.2d at 413. Insofar as this is true, the philosophy under-
lying due course protection is defeated. "[The more the holder knows about the
underlying transaction, and particularly the more he controls or participates or be-
comes involved m it, the less he fits the role of a good faith purchaser for value
the less need there is for giving him the tension-free rights considered necessary in a
fast-moving, credit-extending commercial world." Id. at 109-10, 232 A.2d at 410.
For other cases concerning holders in due course m consumer contracts, see United
States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 285 Ala. 105, 229 So. 2d 495 (1969); Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940); Financial Credit Corp. v.
Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel
347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964); International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272
Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575,
181 A.2d 809 (1962); Burchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d
186 (1964); Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115
(1963).
337 50 N.J. 101, 110, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967).
338. Id. at 125, 232 A.2d at 418.
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cases whether such waiver clauses as the one imposed on Owen
. . are so one-sided as to be contrary to public policy.33 9
The court in Unico thus established that Unico was to be denied
the status of holder in due course because of the close connection
with the seller and that the waiver of defenses clause would not be
enforced because it was unconscionable.
3 40
The Sixth Criterion
The Degree to which Terms of the Transaction Require Con-
sumers to Jeopardize Money or Property beyond the Money or
Property Immediately at Issue in the Transaction
Because of the credit standing of a particular consumer, a merchant
may require a consumer to place title to goods previously purchased
in the hands of the merchant in order to secure payment for subse-
quent purchases. In this way the possibility for abuse by an un-
scrupulous merchant may arise. The merchant may be able to main-
tain his superior position not only because of the inequality of bar-
gaining power, but also because of the leverage arising from the
nature and excess value of the goods securing the purchases. Thus,
the merchant is able to overprotect his interests to the possible detri-
ment of the consumer.341
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,34 2 presents an ex-
ample of a situation clearly within the scope of the sixth criterion.
The consumers had purchased furniture and other household items
339. Id.
340. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code attempts to do away with negotiability
and problems relating to holder in due course status by providing that: "In a credit
sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose,
the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as evi-
dence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A holder is not in good faith if he
takes a negotiable instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this section."
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREarr CODE § 2.403.
The comment to this section adds the caveat to financiers that the prohibition
against taking a negotiable instrument "will be well known m the financial community
after enactment of this Act [and] professional financiers buying consumer paper will
normally not qualify as holders in due course with respect to instruments taken by
dealers in violation of this section and negotiated to them." Id., Comment.
341. The type and amount of security and the ease of obtaining credit depends
on the merchant's assessment of the type of risk area in wich he is operating. Mer-
chants operating in high risk areas operate much differently than those in low risk
areas. A buyer in a high risk area must expect to compensate the seller for the in-
creased risk. For an empirical study of merchants operating in high risk areas, see
Project, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers
in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.LA.L.
REv. 879 (1967).
342. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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on credit from the sellers over a period of years. Before payment
for the initial purchases was completed, the consumers purchased
other items and signed a printed form contract which provided that
title for all the goods, whenever purchased, would remain in Walker-
Thomas until payments for all the items were completed. In the event
of any default, Walker-Thomas could repossess any item whenever
purchased. The contract further provided that the amount of each
payment was to be credited pro rata to all outstanding accounts. In
this way, all items were to be paid off at once. The title to each
item, whenever purchased and regardless of the amount due at the
time of any subsequent purchase, would remain in the seller with an
outstanding balance owing for that item until all amounts were paid.
"As a result, the debt incurred at the tune of purchase of each item
was secured by the right to repossess all items previously purchased
by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased automatically
became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous deal-
ings."334
3
One of the consumers, appellant Williams, had reduced the
balance owing for previous purchases to $164. She then purchased
a stereo for $514. Her total purchases over a five year period
totaled $1800. At the time of her purchases, the furniture store
was fully aware of her financial condition. the contract listed the
name of her social worker and that she received only $218 monthly
in welfare payments. With this amount she was to provide for her-
self and her seven children, as well as make the payments to Walker-
Thomas. 44
When Williams defaulted, Walker-Thomas sought to replevy all
the items for which she had not yet fully paid. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals rejected her contention that the con-
tracts were unconscionable. Although the court acknowledged that
the seller had "full knowledge" of the consumer's financial straits
and that the company's conduct raised "serious questions of sharp
dealing and irresponsible business dealings, '3 45 the court felt that
there was no ground upon which they could declare the contract con-
trary to public policy The circuit court disagreed, holding that the
court as a matter of common law had the power to declare a contract
unconscionable. Although Congress had enacted section 2-302 for the
District of Columbia, the contracts under dispute had been signed
prior to its enactment. The court reasoned that the enactment of this
section did not indicate that the common law "was otherwise at the
time of enactment "346
343. Id. at 447
344. Id. at 448.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 448-49.
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The court stated the requisite elements of unconscionability to
be "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particu-
lar case can only be determined by consideration of all the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. 34 7 However, because the trial
and appellate courts failed to make findings on the possible uncon-
scionability of these transactions, the circuit court remanded the cases
for further proceedings.348
No case presenting a situation similar to Williams has been de-
cided in California. Protection is provided purchasers in this state
against the "balance due" provision in a contract via statutory limita-
tions on the use of goods purchased under previous contracts as secu-
rity for goods purchased subsequently. 49 In the Williams situation,
the provisions of the Unruh Act would have required that payments
made after the last purchases be allocated to the outstanding balance
for the previously purchased items in the "ratio as the original cash
sale prices of the various purchases bear to one another .. ."50
Thus, appellant Williams, who had purchased $1800 worth of items
over five years on which she had made payments totaling $1400,
would have been subject only to the replevy of the stereo. The
$1400 would have been applied to extinguish the security interest
of Walker-Thomas in the previous purchases.
The Seventh Consideration
The Degree to which the Natural Effect of the Practice Is to
Cause or Aid in Causing Consumers to Misunderstand the True
Nature of the Transaction or Their Rights and Duties Thereunder
Practices which tend to cause a consumer to misunderstand his
rights or duties under a contract he signs may not be the result of
intentional acts by the merchant. The consumer may, however, be
347. Id. at 449.
348. Id. at 450.
349. Article 8 of the Unruh Act, Califorma Civil Code sections 1808.1-1808.6
(West 1973), provides protection for consumers faced with clauses m contracts re-
quiring add-on sales. Section 1808.1 allows goods purchased under previous contracts
to be security for subsequent purchases, but only until the item originally purchased
is fully paid. Sections 1808.2 and 1808.3 provide for the allocation of total payments
among the outstanding balances on goods purchased at various times.
350. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1808.2 (West 1973). As an alternative the section con-
tinues "where the amount of each installment payment is increased in connection
with the subsequent purchase, the subsequent payments (at the seller's election) may
be deemed to be allocated as follows: an amount equal to the original payment to
the previous deferred payment price, and an amount equal to the increase, to the sub-
sequent deferred payment price."
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so unfamiliar with the language and methods normally used by mer-
chants that he might misunderstand the nature of an instrument even
without intentional misrepresentation by the merchant.351 The tech-
nical language used m a contract may be impossible for the layman
to read or understand.35 2  Furthermore, the consumer may be en-
couraged not to read the contract because of the representations of
the merchant, because of the fine print, or because a first glance at
the contract may have disclosed language he did not understand. 3'
Criterion seven seeks to incorporate evidence of the practices which
may cause the consumer to misunderstand the contract even though
the merchant did not intend to deceive the consumer.
This is not to say that any consumer who misunderstands a con-
tract can seek its rescission because of unconscionability The use
of the words "natural effect" invokes a standard not unlike the term
"reasonable expectations" often employed m construing ambiguities to
protect the insured in an insurance policy '5 While many practices
may be deceptive and unconscionable per se, it should be expected
that the unconscionability of some practices depends on the facts and
circumstances involved in each case. The standard does, however,
incorporate the notion that deceptive practices cannot be tolerated
under the guise of freedom of contract. Even unintentional prac-
tices which cause a consumer to misunderstand the nature of the
contract will be evidence, though not necessarily conclusive evidence,
of the unconscionable nature of the seller's practices. The notion of
caveat emptor has long since given way to some recognition of a
duty on the behalf of the seller to disclose to the consumer those
facts known to the seller that may reasonably be necessary for the
consumer to make an informed decision.355 The failure of the seller
351. The inequality of bargaining power between a merchant and a consumer has
been discussed m the text accompanying notes 52-64 supra.
352. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405, 410-11 (1967).
353. See Note, Unconscionability: Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-302, 36
ALBANY L. REv. 114, 119 (1971).
354. See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962).
355. In State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303,
321-22 (Sup. Ct. 1966), the court stated: "We have reached the point where 'Let the
buyer beware' is a poor business philosophy for a social order allegedly based upon
man's respect for his fellow man. Let the seller beware, too! A free enterprise sys-
tem not founded upon personal morality will ultimately lose freedom. We also believe
that it is right, proper, just and equitable to tell the consumer, clearly and adequately,
that he is entering into a contract and that he is personally liable for the entire
contract price and that he will be required to make stipulated monthly payments, plus
carrying charges, etc., in language that the least educated person can understand.
And if he chooses not to do so, but instead lures an innocent person into a predicament
where a heavy obligation is incurred due to the fraudulent means exercised by the rep-
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to do so, especially considering the disparity in bargaining power,
may be some evidence that an unconscionable advantage has been
taken of the consumer.3 56
The standard created by criterion seven prohibits unfair and de-
ceptive business practices. In this way, criterion seven complements
the list of "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended
to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to
any consumer . ..-3' which are proscribed by the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act.358 This act allows injunctive relief and any other
relief which the court deems proper without a showing that the
deceptive acts were intentionally employed.3 59
Criterion seven should not be limited to these specifically pro-
scribed practices. Instead, it should be regarded as a standard against
which any possibly deceptive acts can be judged. For example, the
failure to acquaint a consumer with an important fact would not be
resentative, should the innocent victim suffer and hold harmless the seller and thereby
reward him for his highhanded conduct?"
356. See Kugler v. Romain, 58 NJ. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
357. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 1973).
358. Id. §§ 1750-84 (West 1973).
359. The intentional use of a deceptive practice need only be shown if damages
are sought. See id. § 1784 (West 1973). Certain portions of this act bear a close
resemblance to the 1966 version of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The
Uniform Act contains a similar, but shorter, list of proscribed deceptive practices.
However, the language of certain of the sections is significantly different. For exam-
ple, the California act prospribes "Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or
certification of goods or services." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1770(b) (West 1973). The
Uniform Act, however, is somewhat broader, including any person who "causes like-
lihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or
certification of goods or services... " UNiFORm DECEPTIVE TRADE PRAmcEs Acr
§ 2(a) (2).
The Uniform Act also contains a broad provision intended to permit the courts to
develop additional proscribed deceptive practices. Any person who "engages in any
other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstand-
ing." Id. § 2(a)(12). The Commissioners' Prefatory Note indicates that the act was
based to a large extent on California Civil Code section 3369 (West Supp. 1973),
which provides in part: "2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act
of unfair competition within this state may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction. 3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include
unlawful or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising . . " The test of what constitutes "unfair competition!' or "unfair or
fraudulent business practice" is whether the public is likely to be deceived. People v.
National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1962);
accord, Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 172 Cal. App. 2d 235, 342 P.2d 10
(1959). The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act also defines and proscribes de-
ceptive sales practices and provides that an unconscionable practice is a violation of
the act for which all the remedies provided by the act are available. UNIoam CON-
summ SAzLs PRlcrrcEs AcT §§ 3-4.
a representation specifically proscribed by the Consumers Legal Rem-
edies Act unless some misrepresentation of the effect or nature of
that fact had been made, yet such an omission may substantially affect
the rights and duties of the buyer.
Although fraud and unconscionability are often intertwined, 360
the requirements of fraud need not be met for a deceptive practice
to be evidence of unconscionability If any one of the requirements
of fraud has not been satisfied, the deceptive practice is not action-
ably fradulent. Such a practice may, nonetheless, cause a distortion
in the risks properly allocable between the parties. If, in the opinion
of the court, the consumer should be able to transact business free
from such deceptive practices, the transaction may be found to be
unconscionable.
The Eighth Enumerated Factor in Section 5108
The Extent or Degree to which the Writing Purporting to Evi-
dence the Obligation of the Consumer in the Transaction Con-
tains Terms or Provisions or Authorizes Practices Prohibited by
Law
While many of the factors indicating unconscionability necessar-
ily await further interpretation of their precise meaning by the courts
in specific factual disputes, the eighth factor requires little mterpreta-
tion in deciding those circumstances under which it arises. The pro-
liferation of consumer-oriented legislation in recent years has resulted
in drastic changes in the drafting of documents for consumer trans-
actions. 361  Certain terms or provisions in a contract which unfairly
impose risks or burdens on the weaker party to the transaction are
proscribed. 62 Similarly, many of the practices used by unscrupulous
merchants in inducing a consumer to enter, a transaction are pro-
hibited. 36 3  Further such tactics may result in criminal36 as well as
civil liabilities.3 65
360. For example, in State by Lejkowitz v ITM, Inc., the seller's activities were
found to be fraudulent as well as unconscionable. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d
303, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
361. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1725-1812.95 (West 1973).
362. See, e.g., id. § 1804.1.
363. See, e.g., id. § 1770.
364. "Any person who shall willfully violate any provision of this chapter shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. § 1812.6 (emphasis added).
In People v George, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to cheat and
defraud consumers by obtaining signatures on a retail installment contract which pro-
vided for a payment of 25 percent of the contract price if the buyer exercised his
right to rescind. This was contrary to California Civil Code section 1804.1(h) (West
1973). 257 Cal. App. 2d 805, 65 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1968).
365. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1781, 1794 (West 1973).
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Currently the Unruh Act provides that "[alny provision in a
contract which is prohibited by this chapter shall be void but shall
not otherwise affect the validity of the contract. '366  While this pro-
vision will protect the consumer against the effect of a specific harsh
term, the consumer will be unable to rescind the entire contract, 6 7
wuch, even without the illegal term, may not be a fair allocation of
the rights and obligations between unequal bargaining parties. The
other terms of the contract, though not specifically prohibited, may
exact too high a price from the consumer. The prohibited term,
rather than merely an attempt to gain some singular advantage, may
well be indicative of overreaching on the part of the merchant.
The eighth factor goes beyond the Unruh Act, not in that it
renders unconscionable any contract containing a term or authorizing
a practice prohibited by some other law, but rather because it em-
phasizes that such a term may evidence an imbalance in the trans-
action as a whole. Standing alone, the existence of a prohibited
term may not be sufficient to void a contract, but when taken in
combination with other evidence of unfair advantage, the contract
may be unconscionable.
Conclusion
The nine factors of section 5108 present a useful framework
for analyzing possibly unconscionable consumer transactions. Since
many of these factors have long been considered relevant in evaluat-
ing the fairness of contractual obligations, prior decisions will aid in
implementing section 5108. Further, determinations by courts of
other jurisdictions presently operating under Uniform Commercial
Code 2-302 give some indication of the use of and the limits to be
366. Id. § 1804.4. However, m automobile sales financing, failure to comply with
the precise requirements for a written conditional sales contract m accordance with
California Civil Code section 2982 (West Supp. 1973) is grounds for rescission of the
entire contract. Id. § 2983. For example, m Zmak v. Arata Pontiac, 265 Cal. App.
2d 689, 71 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1968), the seller of an automobile offered the buyer $1161
as a trade-in allowance for a new car. The buyers signed the contract for sale in
blank. Later, the seller completed the forms and allowed only $200 for the used car.
The seller never furmshed the buyers with a completed copy of the agreement. He
then assigned the agreement. The seller violated section 2982 m not stating the
true trade-in value, in inducing the buyers to sign in blank, and m not delivering a copy
of the form at the time of the transaction. The court allowed rescission.
367. However, m American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435,
201 A.2d 886 (1964), the court refused to enforce a contract against a breaching
consumer because the seller had failed to comply with the credit disclosure laws of
New Hampshire. This rendered the contract "void so as to prevent the [seller] from
recovering for its breach." Id. at 438, 201 A.2d at 888. Also, in an alternate holding,
the court refused to enforce the contract because of the unconscionable price imposed
on the buyer. Id.
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nposed on the doctrine of unconscionability While the doctrine
of unconscionability has been attacked as a vague, new concept, the
use of the specific factors of section 5108 in analyzing consumer
transactions will promote clarity, which is often lacking in decisions
finding unconscionable conduct.
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